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INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEXITY AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER:  
A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This Doctoral Thesis unfolds into a collection of three distinct papers that share an 
interest in institutional theory and technology transfer. Taking into account that 
organizations are increasingly exposed to a multiplicity of demands and pressures, we 
aim to analyze what renders this situation of institutional complexity more or less 
difficult to manage for organizations, and what makes organizations more or less 
successful in responding to it. The three studies offer a novel contribution both 
theoretically and empirically. In particular, the first paper “The dimensions of 
organizational fields for understanding institutional complexity: A theoretical 
framework” is a theoretical contribution that tries to better understand the relationship 
between institutional complexity and fields by providing a framework. The second 
article “Beyond institutional complexity: The case of different organizational successes 
in confronting multiple institutional logics” is an empirical study which aims to explore 
the strategies that allow organizations facing multiple logics to respond more 
successfully to them. The third work “ How external support may mitigate the barriers 
to university-industry collaboration” is oriented towards practitioners and presents a 
case study about technology transfer in Italy.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT 
 The main objective of this Doctoral Dissertation is to contribute to neo-institutional 
literature by analyzing the “hot topic” of institutional complexity and how organizations 
manage it.  
 Although, neo-institutional theorists have begun to recognize that many organizations 
are fragmented or conflicted, containing competing requirements and prescriptions (Scott, 
2008), scholars in the field tend to agree that many aspects of multiple institutional pressures 
are generally overlooked and under-explored (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008; Reay & Hinings, 
2009; Pache & Santos, 2010; Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta & Lounsbury, 2011). 
In particular, our knowledge about the relationship between institutional field and complexity 
is still insufficient and extant literature is silent about the strategies that allow organizations 
to deal more or less successfully with situations of institutional complexity.      
 The aim of this Doctoral Thesis is to simultaneously provide a framework for 
developing theory and empirically analyze the effect that organizational dynamics have on 
institutional complexity. Indeed, we want to provide an answer to the following research 
questions:   
1) what are the field-level dimensions that contribute to simplify or exacerbate the 
degree of institutional complexity experienced by organizations within fields?  
2) what strategies do organizations adopt to deal with institutional complexity and 
what determine how successful these strategies are in responding to institutional 
complexity? 
 By answering these questions, we explore various aspects already present in previous 
literature and extend current insights, providing a more holistic picture of what leads 
institutional complexity to be more or less deep-rooted in a context, and how the management 
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of it can vary among different organizations.  
 Regarding the empirical analysis, we rely on a sample of 9 organizations dealing with 
technology transfer activities between academia and industry in Italy. We believe this 
research setting being appropriate for alleviating the theoretical gap, because it really 
represents a field characterized by the presence of different stakeholders with diverse 
interests and objectives. Moreover, the structural changes that have occurred in Italy to the 
academic world in the last decade, both from a cultural and normative point of view, have 
deeply affected the establishment of these kind of organizations and resulted in their 
exponential increase. Today, we see a variation in the way university and industry interact 
and we also observe a variation in the degree of success that those organizations score in 
managing the different objectives and interests of the two worlds.   
 Even though university and business have been historically considered as belonging to 
different institutionalized spheres, both culturally and physically, holding separate streams of 
knowledge, in recent years something is changing and the awareness of their interdependence 
is growing, both within academia and industrial world. The importance of improving 
knowledge transfer between public research institutions and third parties has been recognized 
as a fundamental area for action. Therefore, the theme of public-private relationships has 
merited considerable recent attention from scholars, and, within this broad issue, the ones 
between university and industry have caught management researchers’ interest.  
 The nine organizations we sampled represent three different types of organizations 
involved in technology transfer activities between university and industry: three Technology 
Transfer Offices (hereinafter TTOs), three University Incubators (hereinafter UIs), and three 
University-Business Consortia (hereinafter UBC). With regard to the sample and informant 
selection we will explain in detail the process we followed in the following section “Research 
design” and in the third chapter (see the “Methods” section). All these organizations achieve 
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their goals by getting in contact university and industry, in order to transfer and exploit 
academic results for commercial needs. In this sense, as mediating organizations, they 
represent a context where at least two different institutional logics are in the running, the one 
dominating academic environment and the other industrial word. In this sense they 
experience institutional complexity. 
 As concerns data collection, we gathered data with one-to-one interviews and archival 
materials. Finally, we got 53 one-to-one interviews and hundred pages of archival materials. 
With the exception of two skype interviews, interviews took place in informants’ offices and 
lasted between 30 and 65 minutes. As regards the empirical analysis, we rested upon a 
comparative case study (Eisenhardt, 1989), using a system of replication logic, in which each 
case is treated as an independent experiment (Yin, 2003), that corroborates emerging 
theoretical insights.  
 The present research project is relevant both theoretically and practically. From a 
theoretical point of view, in the second chapter we provide a framework to guide future 
research on better understanding the relationship between fields and multiple logics. We 
argue that organizational experience of institutional complexity is fundamentally shaped by 
specific field dimensions, that attains to its structure and its functioning. In the third chapter, 
our results suggest that organizational strategies have a powerful effect on how organizations 
respond to the different interests and objectives coming from diverse stakeholders. This is a 
noteworthy point, if we consider that existing literature has often focused on the 
environmental, rather than internal, determinants of how organizations respond to 
institutional mandates. Moreover, we help to bring some insights about the micro-level 
dynamics of institutional theory. In fact, our study shows that the way organizational actors 
experience different institutional logics is not a direct reflection of how an institution appears 
at the macro level.  
6 
 
 From a managerial point of view, this research, focusing on technology transfer 
organizations and processes, should be of interest both to academics and industrial CEOs, 
which want to undertake a collaborative relation with the other party, but also to mediating 
organizations, that should interact with parties having different mindset and objectives. It 
provides insights on which strategies might be undertaken by organizations in order to 
increase the likelihood to obtain a greater success and effectiveness in letting academics and 
industrial parties collaborate. Moreover, findings could be useful to organizations’ managers 
for better understanding barriers and opportunities in technology transfer relationships where 
multiple interests are present.  
 The remainder of this Chapter is organized as follows: in the following we define the 
theoretical framework, then we provide a detailed characterization of the research design and 
data collection. Finally we describe the three essays composing the Doctoral Dissertation and 
we present our future objectives. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 As previously mentioned, this Doctoral Thesis is focused on the study of institutional 
complexity and the relationship it has with organizational field and organizations.    
 The complexity of institutional processes and their influence on organizational 
behavior has been implicit within the institutional approach since the seminal paper by Meyer 
and Rowan (1977), where the authors underlined the idea that organizations confront 
different typologies of expectations, and that these may be incompatible (Greenwood et al., 
2011; Pache et al., 2010). After them, neo-institutional perspective has become a dominant 
lens within organization theory and scholars pointed out the difficulty that organizations often 
face in coordinating multiple and independent institutional demands from different 
institutional settings (D’Aunno, Sutton & Price, 1991; Elsbach et al., 1992).  
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 However, in the immediate decades following Meyer and Rowan (1977), research was 
primarily directed to other lines of inquiry respect to the one dealing with the problem of 
multiple and often incompatible institutional pressures upon organizations (Greenwood et al., 
2011).  
 The most important turning-point towards this direction was provided by Jackall 
(1988) and Friedland and Alford (1991), who coined the idea of “institutional logics”, as the 
experientially constructed, and thereby contingent set of rules, norms, premiums and 
sanctions that actors in particular contexts create and recreate in such a way that behavior and 
perspective are to some extent regularized and predictable. Starting from this important 
conceptualization, during the past two decades escalating interest in institutional logics has 
been registered and it still remains one of the fastest-growing stream of research in 
organizational theory (Greenwood et al., 2011; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). A growing 
number of studies has focused the attention on the role of institutional logics, however 
adopting different levels of analysis and following diverse approaches. The focus has 
primarily been on the role that dominant logics play in facilitating conformity and legitimacy 
within fields, and, even where the clash of different logics has been recognized, for the most 
part the assumption has been that any contradiction between them is transitional and intended 
to come to an end (Greenwood et al., 2011).  Only recently, some researchers have 
begun to acknowledge that some fields and organizations cope with the coexistence of 
multiple logics over extended periods of time (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Reay & Hinings, 
2009; Lounsbury, 2007; Kraatz & Block, 2008), but we still lack an important understanding 
of some dynamics, especially for what is related to our research questions.    
 
RESEARCH DESIGN  
 Empirical analysis in based on an inductive, multiple case study of organizations 
dealing with technology transfer between university and industry, in Italy. We rest upon a 
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comparative case study (Eisenhardt, 1989), using a system of replication logic, in which each 
case is treated as an independent experiment (Yin, 2003), that corroborates emerging 
theoretical insights. In order to reduce potential biases associated with single case, our study 
focused also on variation within cases, taking into account different organizations of the same 
typology. This allows for a more rigorous analysis, not only in terms of reliability and 
richness, but also in terms of theory generalizability (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
Sampling  
 As regards the sampling of organizations, we rested on a design at two stages. While, 
the first step concerned the choice of the organizations typologies, the second was about the 
selection of the organizations belonging to the same typology (see the “Sampling of 
organizations” section in Chapter 3). At the end we selected 9 organizations, subdivided in 
three different typologies (i.e., TTOs, UIs, and UBC).   
 As about informants choice, we followed the guidelines given by Lincoln and Guba's 
(1985) about "purposeful sampling". We firstly selected informants that would be most able 
to inform us on our theoretical interest (Corley and Gioia, 2004), since directly involved in 
decision-making processes and strategies deployment. Then we asked each informants to 
suggest other people who would have been useful in giving us information about the issue of 
interest. As regards the sampling of academic researchers and industrial CEOs, we asked for 
their names to the informants sampled within the organizations. In particular, we mainly 
followed two main criteria and we asked for 1) academics/CEOs who have been really 
involved in technology transfer projects, independently of the final result; 2) for 
academics/CEOs who have been involved in these kind of activities no more than six months 
ago. In total we selected 48 persons, including organizations’ employees, academics and 
industrial CEOs.  
Data collection 
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 Data collection proceeded in three different phases. The first consisted of an 
exploratory stage (end of 2011), where we conducted 5 interviews (each of them lasting on 
average 45 minutes) with some key informants of our organizations. The second phase (from 
January to February, 2012) was spent in collecting archival materials. During the third step 
(from January to August, 2012) we proceeded with the submission of the semi-structured 
interview protocol to our informants. Interviews were organized around some main areas. As 
concerns the protocol for the organizations, we got the following sections: organizational 
history, organizational structure, organizational strategy, performance, stakeholders and 
perception of logics. Instead, the protocol submitted to academics and CEOs, was organized 
around the following domains: job characteristics, previous collaboration, experiences with 
the sampled organizations, and incentives. The two protocols can be found in Appendix A 
and B.         
 
RESEARCH OUTPUTS 
 The whole project includes three different studies that are intended to answer the 
research questions set above. Whereas the first two studies (Chapter 2 and Chapter 3) are 
rooted in a neo-institutional approach, the last piece of work has a different nature and 
standard. Being it much more applied and oriented towards practitioners, it focuses just on 
two organizations of our sample and develops some insights on the expertise and 
characteristics that TTOs’ employees should have to mitigate the barriers to university-
industry collaboration. Moreover, it is based on the literature on relationship between 
academia and industrial world.     
 
Paper I: The Dimensions of Organizational Fields for Understanding Institutional 
Complexity: A Theoretical Framework 
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 The idea of this work is to integrate the stream of research on institutional logics and 
complexity (e.g., Pache & Santos, 2012; Dunn & Jones, 2010) with the literature on 
institutional fields (e.g., Wooten & Hoffman, 2008; Scott, 1995) in order to develop a 
theoretical framework for better understanding which field-level characteristics affect the 
degree of institutional complexity experienced by organizations within field. Although neo-
institutional literature has recently recognized that organizational fields are often 
characterized by “multiple and often uncoordinated sources of legitimacy” (D’Aunno et al., 
1991), so far the focus has mainly been, at the organizational level, on two facets of 
institutional complexity: the number of logics and the degree of incompatibility between 
them (Greenwood et al., 2011). We know very little about what affect the degree of 
complexity at the field level.  
 We argue that the pattern of institutional complexity experienced by organizations is 
never completely fixed and that the nature of that complexity is fundamentally shaped by 
aspects and processes within fields (Greenwood et al., 2011). To build the theoretical 
framework presented in Chapter, we draw on a variety of cognate literature to identify some 
field-level dimensions and discusses how these dimensions shape the degree of institutional 
complexity confronting organizations (Pache & Santos, 2010). We propose seven 
propositions in our model.   
 Overall, we contribute to the ongoing discussion on institutional complexity and 
fields, and we suggest a framework that may guide future scholars in comparing fields 
empirically.  
 
Paper II: Beyond Institutional Complexity: The Case of Different Organizational 
Successes in Confronting Multiple Institutional Logics 
 This is an empirically work that enhance our knowledge about organizational 
response to institutional complexity.  
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 Organizations experience institutional complexity every time they have to handle the 
divergent interests, goals and practices coming from multiple institutional logics (Greenwood 
et al., 2011). However, not all organizations experience institutional complexity to the same 
degree or are as successful in managing it.  
 We conducted a comparative case study of three different types of organizations 
carrying out technology transfer activities in Italy. As organizations that combine two 
previously separate institutional logics – an  “academic” logic, that is mainly focused on 
basic research, and a “market” logic, focused on financial returns – they all have to handle 
prescriptions and pressures caused by different norms and rules and, therefore, to face the 
same problem of institutional complexity. But, they respond differently to this situation, 
achieving a different degree of success in confronting it. It was just observing this variation 
that we ranked our six organizations in “more” and “less” successful in confronting 
institutional complexity, obtaining three matched pairs, each composed by one “more” and 
one “less” successful organization in confronting multiple logics.  Finally, we uncover three 
main strategies – having boundary spanners, mirroring institutional demands and buffering 
institutional logics – that explain the different success achieved by our organizations in 
dealing with institutional complexity. We propose four propositions.  
 While prior studies have emphasized more episodic “responses” to institutional 
complexity (Greenwood et al., 2011; Pache & Santos, 2010), we moved beyond and found 
that the degree of success achieved by the organization in confronting institutional 
complexity is dependent on the strategies that the organization uses in coping with multiple 
logics. Moreover, we give further insight into micro-level action (Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997) 
by better understanding how actors’ decisions and actions affect the management of 
competing institutional expectations. 
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 This paper has been submitted to the 20013 DRUID Conference, Barcelona, June 17-
19, 2013.  
 
Paper III: How External Support May Mitigate The Barriers To University-Industry 
Collaboration 
 This is an empirical work mostly oriented to practitioners in the field of technology 
transfer between academia and industry. Taking into account that it was not included in the 
original plans of our Doctoral Dissertation, it represents a kind of byproduct that is justified 
by two main reasons. First, it constitutes an important issue in the existing literature on 
innovation and technology transfer and, second, the gathered data lend themselves very well 
to analyze this theme. In particular, the objective has been to write a paper that was of interest 
to practitioners rather than to the scientific community of reference. This is why greater 
importance has been given to the case-study section and the theoretical part has been left 
much less developed. However, the specific aim is to empirically analyze how university-
industry collaboration may be affected by the support of external organizations and what 
characteristics, both of parties and intermediary units, might facilitate the success of these 
relationships. We conducted a case study of two of the most active Technology Transfer 
Offices in Italy, which represent a sub-set of the whole sample of our research.  First of all 
we identify the main barriers to collaboration highlighted by respondents. We hold to the 
three categories of barriers identified by Van Dierdonck and Debackere (1988) and we divide 
our results according to this criterion. Then, we move beyond in analyzing the characteristics 
that might facilitate the relationships between different parties. Three major themes emerged 
in our analysis: the importance of specific TTOs characteristics, the previous experiences of 
parties and the industrial part’s dimension and strategies.  
 Although we contribute to the discussion on technology transfer and innovation 
(Bruneel, D’Este & Salter, 2010; Abramo, D’Angelo, Di Costa & Solazzi, 2009; Perkmann & 
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Walsh, 2007; Agrawal, 2001), we think that the most important implications are the policy 
implications. In particular, findings could be useful to TTOs’ managers for better 
understanding barriers and opportunities in university-industry collaboration where multiple 
interests are present.       
 This paper has been accepted for a possible inclusion in the “Osservatorio” of 
Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, but the Editorial Board of the Journal has 
suggested to submit it to the Journal itself.  
 
FUTURE OBJECTIVES 
 We are completely aware that this Doctoral Dissertation represents a starting point for 
future developments and elaboration. In particular we report in this section our future 
objectives for each paper. 
1. Regarding the first paper, we would like to refine the proposed theoretical model by 
refining the identified propositions and trying to link them reciprocally. In our 
opinion, this would allow to strengthen the overall model and figure out new insight 
for contributing to institutional literature. It would be also interesting to apply the 
model to the technology transfer field we have analyzed.  However, throughout this 
process, we would like to present the paper to the most important conferences all over 
the world in order to have comments and opinions to improve it and render it highly 
publishable.  
2. As concerns the second work, we are working on it to refine some details. However, 
we are going to submit it shortly to a Top Journal. 
3. Regarding the third paper, our objective is to work more on it in order to submit it to 
an international Journal. We would like to deepen and develop the theoretical part, 
refine data and improve the conclusions section. We would try to find a journal 
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specifically interested in technology transfer, as it is a work that mainly gives an 
empirical contribution. 
 
REMINDER   
 The organization of this Doctoral Dissertation is characterized as follows: Chapter 2 
includes Paper I titled “The Dimensions of Organizational Fields for Understanding 
Institutional Complexity: A Theoretical Framework”, in which we provide a theoretical 
framework for better understanding and exploring the relationship between organizational 
fields and institutional complexity.  
 Chapter 3 includes the Paper II titled “Beyond Institutional Complexity: The Case of 
Different Organizational Successes in Confronting Multiple Institutional Logics”, where an 
empirical analysis on which strategies are more likely to lead an organization to respond 
successfully to a situation of institutional complexity is developed. 
 Chapter 4 includes Paper III titled “How External Support May Mitigate The Barriers 
To University-Industry Collaboration”, which provides an empirical investigation about the 
role that external support may have for university-industry collaboration and what 
characteristics, both of parties and intermediary unit, might facilitate the success of those 
relationship. 
 The dissertation is completed by the following Appendices: Appendix A reports the 
questionnaire administered to the organizations (in Italian); Appendix B the one administered 
to academic researchers, executives and industrial managers (in Italian).  
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ABSTRACT 
 
Organizations confront institutional complexity whenever they face different and 
incompatible prescriptions from multiple institutional logics. While many aspects of 
institutional complexity have been discussed in extant literature and the relationship between 
complexity and field has been widely recognized by previous scholars, we still lack a deeper 
understanding of the impact that the latter has on the former. In this paper, we argue that 
institutional field and complexity are interdependent. We draw on a variety of institutional 
literature to discuss and develop the field-level dimensions that might shape the experience of 
complexity within the field by the side of organizations. The theoretical framework herein is 
presented to stimulate and guide future research in the analysis of institutional complexity.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 In this paper, we integrate ideas from the literature on institutional complexity and 
logics (e.g., Pache & Santos, 2012; Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta & Lounsbury, 
2011; Dunn & Jones, 2010; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008) with the literature on institutional 
fields (e.g., Greenwood et al., 2011; Reay & Hinings, 2009) in order to develop a theoretical 
framework for better understanding which characteristics affect the degree of institutional 
complexity experienced by organizations within fields. In particular, we focus on fields’ 
dimensions, taking into account not only the formal structure, but also the internal 
functioning.  
 Neo-institutional literature has recently recognized that organizational fields are often 
characterized by “multiple and often uncoordinated sources of legitimacy” (D’Aunno, Sutton 
& Price, 1991). Therefore, conforming to strong beliefs and rules is difficult for many 
organizations, however, because they face fragmented environments in which multiple 
independent groups and organizations make demands that are, at best, uncoordinated 
(Goodrick & Reay, 2011; Dunn & Jones, 2010; Meyer, Scott, & Strang, 1987). But to date 
the focus has mainly been, at the organizational level, on two facets of institutional 
complexity: the number of logics and the degree of incompatibility between them 
(Greenwood et al., 2011). While a lot of works have highlighted the presence of multiple 
institutional logics and fragmented environments, we know very little about what really 
affects the degree of complexity at the field level and it would be simplistic to take into 
account only the number of the different demands present in the field. Indeed, the nature and 
extent of institutional complexity facing organizations is fundamentally shaped by the 
structure of the organizational fields within which they are located. It is at this level that 
overarching sets of meaning and normative criteria become encoded in “local” logics that are 
manifested in rituals, practices and day-to-day behavior (Greenwood et al., 2011; Pache & 
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Santos, 2010).  
 For this reasons, more conceptual and empirical work is needed to map the variety 
and richness of institutional environments (D’Aunno et al., 1991; Scott & Meyer, 1983). 
Within some organizational fields, there may be clearly defined hierarchies of institutional 
pressures based on the salience of particular norms and beliefs. In such environments, the 
experience of complexity, by the side of organizations, may be relatively uniform and easily 
understood. Other fields, however, may be best characterized as free markets for beliefs, with 
several institutional logics competing for attention and acceptance. Further, there may be no 
central authority or powerful group limiting competition among various interests and the 
enforcement of rules may be less strong (Wooten & Hoffman, 2008; Goodrick & Salancik, 
1996; D’Aunno et al., 1991). Overall, fields are not the same. Their dimensions may vary a 
lot in terms of strength and importance, conditioning the balance between diverse belief 
systems and rules. In this sense, institutional fields are little understood.  
 What are, we ask, the field-level dimensions that contribute to simplify or exacerbate 
the degree of institutional complexity experienced by organizations within fields?  
 Importantly, we argue that the pattern of institutional complexity experienced by 
organizations is never completely fixed and that the nature of that complexity is 
fundamentally shaped by aspects and processes within fields (Greenwood et al., 2011).  
 In developing this theoretical framework, we contribute to the ongoing discussion of 
institutional complexity and fields. Specifically, we draw on a variety of cognate literature to 
identify and discuss how field-level dimensions shape the degree of institutional complexity 
confronting organizations (Greenwood et al., 2011; Pache & Santos, 2010). We explore 
various aspects already present in previous literature and extend current insights, providing a 
more holistic picture, in terms of analytical framework, of what leads institutional complexity 
to be more or less deep-rooted. We offer this model as a suggested guide by which future 
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scholars might compare fields, empirically analyzing the relationship between them and 
multiple institutional pressures. Finally, we discuss the implications of this framework.        
 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 The study of institutions has a long history in organizational analysis, beginning in the 
mid of the last century with Selznick and Parson, who highlighted the relationship between 
institutions and organizations, focusing, specifically, on the role that universalistic rules, 
contracts, and authority had in the integration of organizations within society (Thornton & 
Ocasio, 2008). This early version of institutional theory basically saw organizations as 
institutions infused with meaning, value and legitimacy by their members and leaders 
(Selznick, 1957). Even the emergence of a new approach to institutional analysis in 1970s did 
not change a lot this initial perspective. Indeed, in the immediate decades following Meyer 
and Rowan (1977), the focus has been mainly directed in understanding the way in which 
organizations try to secure legitimacy and support in complying with the institutional 
pressures emanating from the field (Powell & DiMaggio, 1983).  
 Although the complexity of institutional processes and the influence they have on 
organizations has been implicit within institutional approach since Meyer and Rowan’s 
(1977) work, who stated that “institutional environments are often pluralistic and societies 
promulgate sharply inconsistent myths”, also this new phase of institutional theory put its 
emphasis, at least at the beginning, on the taken-for-granted character of institutional rules, 
myths, and beliefs and on the processes by which organizations tend to be homogenous for 
gaining legitimacy from the external context. In this sense, this theory has generated valuable 
insights into the processes that define and explain institutionalization in organizational 
contexts and the influence they have on organizational conformity to the environment itself 
(Oliver, 1991). Specifically, it can be said that the processes and effects of institutionalization 
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occurs at two different levels (Phillips, Lawrence & Hardy, 2000). At the organizational level 
we observe that certain ways of acting and organizing become the recognized way of 
interpreting and patterning interaction under particular circumstances (Phillips et al., 2000; 
Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Some examples are the corporation form (Zucker, 1983) or the civil 
services procedures adopted by municipal governments after the reform (Tolbert & Zucker, 
1983), which have become the taken-for-granted way of organizing some kind of activities. 
But, also at the field level we see that intra-organizational activities are affected by specific 
modes of behaving and organizing that become widely accepted and understood. So, 
institutionalized rules and norms become shared by groups of organizations that partake in 
related activities.  
 Although the relation between fields, organizations and institutions has been widely 
recognized for long time, only recently a renewed interest has called attention to the need to 
better understand the dynamics that affect this interrelationship. In particular, the recent focus 
on contexts highly fragmented has made this issue even more “problematic” and interesting.       
 ORGANIZATIONAL FIELDS 
 Although the notion of field has been central to institutional theory from the very 
beginning, it has not received very high emphasis from institutional literature. However, 
since the unit of analysis of most of the institutional works has been referred to social 
processes and forces that lie beyond the organizational boundary (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; 
Scott, 2008; Hoffman, 1999), the term organizational field has become the one accepted for 
identifying the “constellation of actors that comprise this central organizing unit” (Wooten & 
Hoffman, 2008). We stay with the concept provided by Lawrence and Phillips (2004), who 
said that the field is “a set of organizations that constitute a recognized area of life, are 
characterized by structured network relations, and share a set of institutions”. 
 DiMaggio and Powell (1983), in defining the field as a “set of organizations that, in 
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the aggregate, constitute an area of institutional life; key suppliers, resource and product 
consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services or 
products”, focused the attention on the idea of “set”, which refers to a community of 
organizations that directly interact with one another and are affected by their reciprocal 
actions and behaviors (Greenwood, Suddaby & Hinings 2002). But, more than a set of 
organizations, a field is the “place” where relations are undertaken and a common system of 
meaning is shared. Scott (1994), in strengthening the idea of aggregation by indicating field 
as “a community of organizations (…) whose participants interact more frequently and 
fatefully with one another than with actors outside the field”, added the fundamental insight 
that organizations “participate in the same meaning systems, are defined by similar symbolic 
processes, and are subject to common regulatory rules”. Therefore, organizations in the same 
field share common, uniform rules and resources. Also Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) 
indicated a field as “a network, or a configuration of, objective relations between positions”. 
Again, Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) referred to institutional fields as “clusters of 
organizations and occupations whose boundaries, identities, and interactions are defined and 
stabilized by shared institutional logics”. And Mazza and Pedersen (2004) said that the field 
“simply defines a social space and identifies a number of nodes, points of observations or 
positions and their mutual relations”. Therefore, building on DiMaggio and Powell’s (1991) 
assumption that field are socially constructed, the most important aspects of field are exactly 
its relational and cultural elements (Scott, 1994). Indeed, each field is mainly defined by a 
meaning system which establishes the rules of actions, the appropriate way of behaving and 
the right practices that are in common among the organizational community of reference 
(Greenwood et al., 2002; Phillips et al., 2000).  
 So, firm’s actions and decisions are not seen as a completely free choice among an 
unlimited range of possibilities, but rather a quite predetermined choice among a narrowly 
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defined set of options, legitimated by the repeated interactions among the group of actors 
constituting the whole organizational field (Hoffman, 1999; Wooten & Hoffman, 2008). Such 
evolving ideas focused on the fact that organizational field may be understood as a mean to 
better know the impact that rationalization and legitimacy have on organizations (Wooten & 
Hoffman, 2008). Its intermediary position between the organizational and societal level 
enables it to disseminate and reproduce the socially constructed expectations and practices 
developed by organizational actors (Greenwood et al., 2002).  
 In this sense, institutional literature agree upon the fact that organizations within fields 
are guided by institutions. Although the term institution has been used in very different ways 
with respect to social phenomena (Jepperson, 1991; Phillips et al., 2000), here we use it to 
refer to institutional logics (Friedland & Alford, 1991). So, institutional logics, as the “taken-
for-granted patterns of organizing that shape and constrain the behavior of societal 
members”, (Phillips et al., 2000; see also Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Zucker, 1983) provide 
the organizing principles for a field. Organizations use these sets of cultural rules and norms 
to structure their actions and interpret social activity, so providing stability and collective 
meaning to social behavior (Wooten & Hoffman, 2008; Phillips et al., 2000; Scott, 1994). In 
particular, these institutionalized patterns act both as a resource for solving problems and, 
simultaneously, as a constraining factor of social actors’ decisions, providing legitimated 
ways of proceeding in social interaction. In fact, previous literature stressed the fact that joint 
values and beliefs hold together the community of actors belonging to a particular field 
(Scott, 2008; Reay & Hinings, 2009). Hereinafter, we refer to community as that entity 
embodying specific understanding, norms, and rules that serve as touchstones for legitimating 
mental models upon which individuals and organizations draw to create common definitions 
of a situation (Marquis, Glynn & Davis, 2007).  
 According to Giddens (1984), institutional fields develop through a process of 
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structuration, where rules and resources constituting the field are produced and reproduced by 
social actions (Phillips et al., 2000). Di Maggio and Powell (1983) said that this process 
consists of four parts: “an increase in the extent of interaction among organizations in the 
field; the emergence of sharply defined inter-organizational structures of domination and 
patterns of coalition; an increase in the information load with which organizations in a field 
must contend; and the development of a mutual awareness among participants in a set of 
organizations that they are involved in a common enterprise”.  
 Whereas, some conceptions of the field emphasize the extent to which field 
participants hold similar beliefs regarding goals, norms, and social logics, it is also true that, 
relatively early, analysts recognized that fields are often the site of conflict among contending 
factions (DiMaggio, 1991; see also Scott, 2008). In this sense, Hoffman (1999) stated that a 
“field is not formed around common technologies or common industries, but around issues 
that bring together various field constituents with disparate purposes”. The relational process 
within fields may more resemble to “institutional war” (White, 1992) than isomorphic 
dialogue.  
 Recently, a body of institutional research has tended to highlight the conflictive nature 
of field relationship, where the interplay between actors and power relations highly count. 
For example, Brint and Karabel (1991) defined organizational fields as “arenas of power 
relations” and Hoffman (1999) in terms of “centers of debates in which competing interests 
negotiate over issue interpretation”. Also Reay and Hinings (2005) pointed out that fields are 
as a ‘battlefield’ (Bourdieu, 1975; DiMaggio, 1983), where actors interact with each other 
continuously, sometimes in antagonistic ways. 
 INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS  
 Whereas institutional pressures have been conceived in terms of normative 
prescriptions, rules and social expectations (Scott, 2001), Friedland and Alford’s (1991) 
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seminal essay, creating a new approach to institutional analysis, posited institutional logics as 
defining the content and meaning of institutions. The concept of institutional logics was, 
therefore, introduced to describe the sets of “material practices and symbolic constructions” 
(Friedland & Alford, 1991) that establish the organizing principles of society. In this sense, 
logics give content and meaning to institutions, serving as a link between institutions and 
organizational actions (Reay & Hinings, 2009), and providing “rules of actions that help 
actors to cope with ambiguity and cognitive limitations” (Thornton, 2002, 2004; Tracey, 
Phillips & Jarvis, 2010). More in detail, institutional logics connect internal cognitive sphere 
with external rituals and practices, that is meaning with actions (Thornton, 2004; Tracey et 
al., 2010). In this work, we use the term institutional logic to refer to the “broader cultural 
beliefs and rules that structure cognition and guide decision making” (Lounsbury, 2007; see 
also Friedland & Alford, 1991) 
 The description of institutional logics that guide actors’ behavior helps to define the 
organizational field within which they interact. The logic embedded in a specific field makes 
clear to its participants the rules of the game, that is the regulatory regimes and the normative 
orders to which organizations are subject. In this sense, institutional logics delineate the 
boundaries of fields, promote conformity within fields (Phillips et al., 2000), and create the 
identities of field members. 
 Friedland and Alford (1991), considering the core institutions of society, the 
capitalistic market, the bureaucratic state, nuclear family, democracy, and Christian religion, 
pointed out that each is associated with a distinctive logic, that shapes and constrains 
individuals’ behaviors and goals. Therefore, even the concept of institutional logic, following 
this initial stream of research that has for a long time asserted that organizational behaviors 
are always reproduced in the same way because of legitimated and taken-for-granted social 
norms (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006), has been, for the most part, connected to the 
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concepts of stability and conformity. For this reason, institutional theorists have been more 
involved in giving insights about the process of institutional steadiness, instead of change 
(Clemens & Cook, 1999). This has meant that great emphasis has been placed on how the 
adoption of similar practices and structures by the side of organizations works and on the role 
that dominant logics play in facilitating uniformity within fields. In this early view 
organizations and their interests were underemphasized, and in some case discounted, as 
relevant to understanding institutionalized practices (Goodrick and Salancik, 1996). 
“Institutions as equilibrium” (Calvert, 1995) has been the motto until few years ago, when the 
literature began to pay more attention on the possible co-existence of multiple logics within 
the same field or the same organization, and renew attention to interests and agency 
(Greenwood et al., 2011; Goodrick and Salancik, 1996; Goodstein, 1994).  
 This shift of direction has received, lately, a growing attention by scholar, taking into 
account that where multiple institutions compete or no institution is firmly established, action 
becomes less predictable (Oliver, 1991). Recent works have stressed the fact that whenever 
organizations confront different prescriptions from multiple institutional logics, they 
experience a situation of institutional complexity (Greenwood et al., 2011; Dunn & Jones, 
2010). In this sense, scholars have recognized that institutional environment are often 
fragmented, with conflicting pressures that make agreement difficult and consensus 
impossible among multiple logics (D’Aunno et al., 1991; Dunn & Jones, 2010). Therefore, 
organizations dealing with multiple institutional demands operate within multiple sphere and 
are subject to different regulatory regimes, normative orders and cultural logics (Kraatz & 
Block, 2008; Pache & Santos, 2012). D’Aunno, Sutton and Price (1991) said that 
“conforming to strong environmental beliefs and rules is difficult for many organizations (…) 
because they face fragmented environments in which multiple independent groups and 
organizations make demands that are, at best, uncoordinated” (see also Greenwood et al., 
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2011). The recognition that contexts are characterized by a plurality of demands, expression 
of different institutional logics, has opened the door to an almost recent interest by 
institutional theory in how organizations cope with these multiple pressures and how this 
affects the subsequent equilibrium within the organization itself. Whether before the focus 
had primarily been on the role that dominant logics play in facilitating isomorphism and 
homogeneity, without considering the possibility to have multiple logics at the same time, 
nowadays scholars have shown that, while institutions constrain actions, they also provide 
source of agency and change (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008; Reay & Hinings, 2009; Tracey et 
al., 2010).  
 A complete and uncontested institutionalization is rare and interests and agency play a 
role in determining how organizations adapt to their institutional environments (Goodrick and 
Salncik, 1996). Oliver (1991), for example, noted that because institutional environments are 
not always unitary and organizations are not always passive, an organization may respond to 
institutional pressures according to its resource dependencies. Goodstein (1994) suggested 
that organizations respond strategically to institutional pressures, depending on their 
constraints and incentives. Such conditions enhance “administrative complexity, increase 
decoupling between structures and activities, undermine stability of offices and programs, 
produce hybrid structures, and penalize organizational legitimacy” (Scott, 2008). Reay and 
Hinings (2009), for instance, analyzed the health care system in Canada, as a context where 
medical professionalism and business-like health care logics were competing for lengthy 
periods of time, without one prevailing on the other. Also Lounsbury (2007) investigated the 
way in which trustee and performance logics led to variation in practices diffusion in the field 
of mutual funds and professional firms. Again, Greenwood et al. (2010) explored the 
influence of two nonmarket logics — the state and the family — upon the behavior of 
corporate organizations. And, Jay (forthcoming) developed a process model about navigating 
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paradoxes implied in situations of institutional complexity, analyzing the Cambridge Energy 
Alliance (CEA) where a combination of public service and client service logics were at stake. 
 Both where a dominant logic prevails against some others, and where a competition or 
combination among multiple logics on the same footing is present over extended periods of 
time, the effects on organizational processes are significant. The most important consequence 
of combining logics is organizational instability and change, which previous scholars have 
largely described in terms of power struggles and negotiations among internal and external 
constituencies adhering to different institutional templates (Jay, forthcoming).  
 FIELD, LOGICS AND COMPLEXITY 
 Although little effort has been made by previous research in comparing organizational 
fields (Greenwood et al., 2011), as place where institutional logics take shape and are 
enacted, they constitute the most important setting for better understanding institutional 
complexity and the implications it has at the organizational level. Institutional logics, as the 
“taken-for-granted patterns of organizing that shape and constrain the behavior of societal 
members”, (Phillips et al., 2000; see also Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Zucker, 1983) provide 
the organizing principles for a field. 
 Indeed, the condition of institutional complexity experienced by an organization, both 
in terms of nature and degree, is fundamentally shaped by the structure of the organizational 
fields (Greenwood et al., 2011). We use the term institutional complexity to refer to situations 
in which organizations have to confront the different influences and demands exerted by 
multiple, often conflicting, logics within their reference context. 
 Institutional theory has for a long time tried to provide a theoretical framework for 
explaining how the social environment, in which organizations are embedded, influences 
their behavior. Whether institutional logics represent the cultural and normative template of a 
field, and whether organizations confront situations of institutional complexity, it follows that 
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organizational fields themselves are structured around multiple logics. So, we stay with the 
idea that “institutional environments are often pluralistic and societies promulgate sharply 
inconsistent myths" (Mayer & Rowan, 1977; see also D’Aunno et al., 1991). Hoffman 
(1999), among others, has argued that “some fields are formed around issues rather than in 
terms of common products or markets” (see also, Scott, 2008). For example, chemical 
companies, hospitals and universities participate in a contested field defined by differences 
over their goals and responsibilities. The “two or more strong, competing or conflicting belief 
systems” (Scott, 1994) characterizing an organizational field, define the inherent rivalry 
among the diverse, existing positions. For this reason, “logics are formulated and relations are 
structured as much by disagreement as by agreement” (Scott, 2008). It is widely recognized 
that the boundaries of fields, the identities of field members, and the relations and interactions 
between field members are delineated and maintained by multiple institutional logics 
(Greenwood et al., 2011; Reay & Hinings, 2009; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006).  
 Therefore, the concept of organizational field remind us that organizations operate in 
systems composed of both similar and diverse cultural and normative regimes, that the 
environment within which organizations act is itself organized around a complex social 
structure, and that organizations are affected by internal and external relations that may have 
both a cooperative and a competitive nature (Scott, 2008). For all these reasons, “the nature 
and extent of institutional complexity facing organization is fundamentally shaped by the 
structure of the organizational fields within which they are located” (Greenwood et al., 2011). 
At the end, organizational fields are described in terms of the organizations belonging to it, 
the set of institutional logics characterizing different cultural and normative templates and the 
interrelationship among them. For those who consider fields and logics as synonyms, here we 
stay with the prevalent idea that the field is described in terms of different aspects and it 
mainly refers to the idea of network, while the logics are the cultural basis through which the 
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field operates. This obviously implies difference between them.  
   -------------------------------------------------------- 
    Insert Table 1 about here 
   -------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 Even though the relationship between institutional complexity and field has been 
widely recognized by scholars, it has not been deeply analyzed by institutional literature. 
Taking into account the growing importance that complexity plays in recent literature, the 
attempt to theoretically understand what makes it more or less intense in the field is really 
significant, also for analyzing the subsequent effect it has on organizations’ response. For this 
reason, our aim here is to develop a theoretical model for answering the following question: 
which field-level dimensions do affect the degree of institutional complexity experienced by 
organizations within fields?  
 CURRENT APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONAL FIELDS 
 It is at the field level that overarching sets of meaning and normative criteria become 
encoded in logics that are manifested in practices, actions and day-to-day behavior 
(Greenwood et al., 2011). So, the rules and norms associated with institutional fields provide 
the context in which organizational actions occurs. But, if fields are composed of multiple 
logics, then organizations experience a situation of institutional complexity that subject them 
to confront different demands coming from different stakeholders. However, “fields are not 
all the same” (Greenwood et al., 2011), and the degree of complexity they confront does not 
depend only on the number of logics present in the field, but also on their degree of 
incompatibility. Thus, institutional complexity is importantly determined by the number of 
logics at play in the field – the higher the number, the greater will be the degree of 
complexity confronted by an organization – but also by the divergence among them – the 
higher the divergence, the more amplified will be the complexity perceived by an 
organization.  
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 Although a predominant approach has been used and developed in recent years by 
institutional scholars, we still lack a fully developed framework.  
 Emerging versus mature fields 
 The more recent approach for studying the relationship between organizational fields 
and institutional complexity is that highlighted by Greenwood and colleagues (2011), which 
is based on the comparison between emerging and mature fields. Previous literature 
recognized that, whereas mature fields already have a regularized functioning and a natural 
and appropriate arrangement, emerging fields are in evolution and without a clear 
institutional infrastructure (Greenwood et al., 2011; Purdy and Gray, 2009; Déjean, Gond & 
Leca, 2004; Lawrence & Phillips, 2004; Goodrick and Salancik, 1996). In fact, even though 
an instable equilibrium caused by institutional complexity is present, established fields have 
more identifiable patterns of interaction among organizations in the field, with a clearer 
distribution of influence over norms by actors. In this sense, although few studies really tease 
out the relationship between field maturity and institutional complexity, and its subsequent 
implications, it is quite implicit for some scholars that, due to the fact that mature fields are 
more settled, tensions among logics have been worked out and the different demands tend to 
be more predictable respect to emerging fields, the degree of institutional complexity 
perceived by organizations should be lower (Greenwood et al., 2011). DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983) depicted a two-step model referring to a field life cycle. During field ‘youth’, changes 
are more likely to be implemented and instability among logics is more present, while during 
field ‘maturity’, institutional isomorphism paves the way to field stability (Mazza & 
Pedersen, 2004).  
 Goodrick and Salancik (1996), for example, based their work on the assumption that 
institutional standards may be uncertain. It is just the uncertainty of such institutional 
templates that might render them insufficient for constraining practice, therefore increasing 
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the likelihood for organizations to face a condition of greater institutional complexity. In this 
sense, emerging fields, as settings where “institutional rules defining legitimate activities, 
membership, and boundaries remain ambiguous, permeable, and not widely understood” 
(Greenwood et al., 2011), are more uncertain than mature fields and so more exposed to 
complexity. In fact, emerging fields typically have unsettled boundaries that allow 
organizations from outside to easily enter, probably bringing with them practices rooted in 
logics different from those present in the field, thus complicating the balance of interests and 
the relative hierarchy of logics within the field itself (Lawrence & Phillips, 2004; Déjean et 
al., 2004). For example, isomorphic pressures will be less relevant if there are no established 
patterns or leaders to mimic; the widely shared values associated with normative forces have 
yet to develop; and diffuse power makes it difficult for individual actors to coerce others 
(Maguire et al., 2004). The structure of the field, therefore, might be unpredictably 
fragmented, such that organizations would face a high degree of institutional complexity 
(Greenwood et al., 2011). On the other hand, other scholars pointed out that the predictability 
of complexity can be expected to enable organizations to be more inclined to manage and 
respond effectively to institutional complexity, mitigating its challenge. In this sense, fields 
facing a relatively predictable and consistent set of competing demands, as in the case of 
emerging fields, should be better able to develop appropriate internal structures and practices 
(Greenwood et al., 2011; Lounsbury, 2007).  
 Besides these contradictory insights about the relationship between mature or 
emerging fields and complexity, the idea of mature fields as more stable and settled in part 
arises from the assumption that such fields have a dominant logic, often single (Greenwood et 
al., 2011). But, even mature fields may be constituted of multiple logics that continue to 
coexist over an extended period of time (Reay & Hinings, 2009). For this reason, they might 
be subject to a condition of institutional complexity, where agreement exist only over a set of 
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institutional practices, or it does not exist at all and rivalry and divergence are always present 
(Greenwood et al., 2011; Goodrick & Salancik, 1996). In fact, organizational field should be 
seen, not as static, but as evolving through the entry and the exit of particular organizations 
(Barnett & Carroll, 1995) and/or through alteration of the interaction patterns and power 
balances among them (Hoffman, 1999; see also Brint & Karabel, 1991; Greenwood & 
Hinings, 1996). Indeed, whether emerging fields should be more subject to institutional 
complexity due to their uncertain structure, also mature ones may be exposed to profound 
transformations, that might result in relational changes among existing organizations, changes 
in boundaries of existing organizations, changes in field boundaries and governance structure, 
and the emergence of new populations (Mazza & Pedersen, 2004; Scott et al., 2000). 
Moreover, an alteration of the field configuration comes together with an alteration of the 
corresponding institutions, which should be redefined through a political negotiation among 
the interests embedded into the different logics (Hoffman, 1999; Oliver, 1991).  
 Thus, taking into account these different points of view about emerging and mature 
fields, we need to deepen our knowledge about the experience of complexity in fields 
characterized by different stages of development. Even though a growing number of works 
use this approach to deal with this issue, we think that a different one should be more useful 
to better understand the relationship between fields and complexity.         
 
3. AN EXPANDED FRAMEWORK TO LINK FIELD DIMENSIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL 
COMPLEXITY 
 Although recent progress made by institutional literature in exploring institutional 
complexity and related issues, it is useful to provide more substantive and dynamic accounts 
of field infrastructure, in order to better know what, and how, affects the organizational 
experience of complexity within the field (Greenwood et al., 2011).  
36 
 
   -------------------------------------------------------- 
    Insert Figure 1 about here 
   -------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 If previous work has tended to assume that all institutional demands are equal, we 
argue that organizational fields may be exposed to a degree of institutional complexity of 
varying strength and importance (D’Aunno et al., 1991). They vary in the configuration of 
their wider structures and legitimating rules (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 
1977), as well as in the complexity of their resource and power arrangements (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). As a result, they also vary in the nature of the demands that they exert on 
organizations and in the way they impose and monitor these demands. Therefore, while few 
fields might have clearly defined hierarchies of demands based on the salience of particular 
beliefs, with very precise norms and rules guiding organizational actions, the most part of 
fields may be best characterized as free markets for interests and goals, with several belief 
systems competing for attention and acceptance. Further, considering that not all the fields 
are the same, in addition to the number of logics and their characteristics, we need to know 
the structural conditions that make a field more or less able to simplify institutional 
complexity.  
 We basically assume that each field consists of one or more available logics, as well 
as an array of appropriate collective organizational identities and practices from which 
individual organizations assemble their particular actions (Thornton, Ocasio & Lounsbury, 
2012). To the extent that institutional fields are informed by plural logics, the degree of 
variation across them will be greater .   
 Indeed, our aim here is to provide a theoretical framework for comparing fields, 
according to particular, identified dimensions. This attempt should be useful for empirical 
analysis trying to catch the relationship between field characteristics, logics and complexity 
in a more precise way.   
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 FRAGMENTATION, CENTRALIZATION, AND FORMAL STRUCTURING 
 Considering that the distinction between emerging and mature fields is not so crucial 
for specifying the link between fields and institutional complexity, an alternative approach, 
more prominent in the early years of the second phase of institutional research (e.g., Meyer 
and Scott, 1983), has been recently regained in order to distinguish between fields according 
to specific dimensions (Greenwood et al., 2011). Following this approach, fields are 
compared according to their degree of fragmentation, centralization, and formal structuring. 
 The basic assumption is that the degree of institutional complexity perceived by 
organizations within the field, is not only dependent on the number of logics, but also, and 
more importantly, on the specific characteristics of the field of reference.  
 Fragmentation 
 Meyer and Rowan (1977) suggested in their seminal work that organizations are 
embedded in pluralistic institutional environments that are often permeated with sharply 
inconsistent logics. While according to Greenwood and colleagues (2011), fragmentation 
“refers to the number of uncoordinated constituents upon which an organization is dependent 
for legitimacy or material resources”, Meyer, Scott and Strang (1987) stated that 
“fragmentation refers to the number of uncoordinated organizations or social actors on which 
field members depend”. Here we stay with the idea that fragmentation is about the number of 
logics present in a field and pressing upon organizations.  
 According to previous definitions, a fragmented field is made more complex by the 
interaction of multiple sets of institutional rules and standards which may be in conflict one 
another. Building on the work of Scott and Meyer (1991), we propose that conflicting 
institutional demands are particularly likely to emerge in fragmented fields (Pache & Santos, 
2010). D’Aunno, Sutton and Price (1991), for example, demonstrated that the multiple and 
often uncoordinated sources of legitimacy in the health care industry, especially in the mental 
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health and drug abuse treatment sectors, lead organizations in the field to have complex 
networks consisting of different groups with different interests. Some of these groups have 
formal authority over specific aspects, and others have informal influence; but none has the 
authority to coordinate or reconcile conflicting rules and beliefs (D’Aunno et al., 1991). In 
the same vein, Goodrick and Salancik (1996) studied the cesarean section surgeries in 
hospitals, as a setting that contains observable variations in practices and organizational 
interests, with no certain institutional standards. Another example is that presented by Meyer 
and colleagues (1987) and Meyer and Scott (1983) about school system. They contended that 
the multiple functions and meanings attributed to education by the different stakeholders, 
who have competing demands, – e.g., teachers, parents, local communities, churches, local 
government, and so forth – give rise to complex and often conflicting pressures on school 
system. Pache and Santos (2010), in making a comparison between fragmented fields, such as 
the education sector in the United States (Scott & Meyer, 1991), and unified ones, such as the 
military field in most democratic countries, proposed that whereas the former are 
characterized by the coexistence of multiple uncoordinated actors, each favoring disparate 
sets of institutional prescriptions, the latter view organizations as dependent on a few decision 
makers.  
 The coexistence of multiple uncoordinated actors and their respective logics about 
what constitutes effective or legitimate behavior increase the likelihood that institutional 
expectations may compete (Pache & Santos, 2010; Ruef & Scott, 1998). In fact, the 
increasing heterogeneity of interests and goals embedded in the different logics and the 
reduced ability to control and coordinating the field according to uniform and widely 
legitimated norms and rules, make a fragmented institutional environment more likely to be 
characterized by ambiguity, dissensus, conflict, and a general lack of coordinated direction 
(Carroll, Goodstein & Gyenes, 1988; Goodrick & Salancik, 1996). In this sense, “it is 
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assumed that fragmentation alone will increase the complexity confronting an organization” 
(Greenwood et al., 2011).  
 Proposition 1: The degree of institutional complexity within a field is directly 
 proportional to the level of fragmentation of the field itself 
 Centralization 
 While fragmentation is about the number of demands present in a field and 
influencing organizations within the field itself, centralization concerns the hierarchical 
power structure of the field and accounts for the presence of dominant actors at the field level 
that support and enforce prevailing logics (Greenwood et al., 2011; Pache & Santos, 2010).  
 Much of the previous thinking on institutional environments has implicitly assumed 
that the structure is centralized. But, building on the work of Carroll, Goodstein and Gyenes 
(1988) we believe that it should be a variable and should change according to different fields. 
Diverse ways of referring to this issue have been used by previous scholars. Whereas 
DiMaggio (1983) referred to a "dominance hierarchy" within fields, Mensal (1960), 
Eisenstadt (1968), and Shils (1975) suggested the imagery of “central” and “peripheral” 
organizations as a useful way of capturing these hierarchical relations (Greenwood et al., 
2006). The notion of center and periphery embraces both the relative organizations 
embeddedness within the field, and the capacity of central actors within a social structure to 
establish and sustain an institutional logic favorable to their interests. As their centrality 
increases, organizations increasingly treat institutional logics and the social behaviors 
encoded within them as taken-for-granted and hegemonic (Greenwood et al., 2006).  
 Meyer and colleagues (1987), analyzing the change of the American educational 
system, pointed out that the gradual expansion of state funding and decision making 
represented the gradual evolution of a strong node of authority in the field, which contributed 
to simplify the local school district. With this change “the environment becomes more 
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centralized but also more unified: the organizational rules (…) become more clear, better 
specified, more uniform and integrated than before” (Meyer et al., 1987). Also Greenwood et 
al. (2010) in their study about nonmarket logics in Franco’s Spain, asserted that the low 
degree of institutional complexity faced by organizations was dependent on the clear 
hierarchy among institutional referents.  
 So, the lack of a centralized actor within the field involves the absence of unifying and 
certain practices and the exposure to multiple competing demands, therefore increasing the 
degree of institutional complexity present in the field. In centralized fields controls are more 
easily imposed, leaving little room or motivation for organizational behaviors and actions that 
lie outside the legitimated ones. In fact, controls are coordinated and imposed unambiguously 
on organizations by the focal actors (Carroll et al., 1988). Such powerful actors may include 
educational and professional organizations (Greenwood et al., 2002), that influence behaviors 
through normative socialization and accreditation processes, regulatory authorities (Holm, 
1995), that use their legal power to coerce organizations to behave in a certain way, and 
major funders (Ruef & Scott, 1998), that resort resource dependence relationships for 
exercising their dominance. In this sense, fields that are highly centralized typically rely on 
one, few principal constituents, whose authority in the field is both formalized and 
recognized (Meyer et al., 1987). In contrast, decentralized fields, characterized by rather 
weak institutional pressures, are poorly formalized. They are defined by the absence of 
dominant organizations and by incompatible pressures, that can be easily ignored or 
challenged by organizations, since the referents exerting them have little ability to monitor 
and enforce them. Therefore, it is often assumed that an environment in which control is 
shifted upward in level (and thus centralized) is thereby unified and simplified: complexity is 
absorbed at the central level, and a given local organization therefore faces a simpler 
environment (Meyer et al., 1987).  
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 Pache and Santos (2010) proposed a different conceptualization to arrive at a similar 
conclusion. In joining fragmentation and centralization, they argued that fields moderately 
centralized, that is “characterized by the competing influence of multiple and misaligned 
players whose influence is not dominant yet is potent enough to be imposed on 
organizations” (Pache & Santos, 2010), face a more acute institutional complexity respect to 
others. In this sense, according to this exposition, fields experiencing the highest level of 
complexity are those fragmented, i.e., composed of multiple actors who are expression of 
different logics, and mildly centralized, i.e., subject to different demands, none of which 
prevailing on the others.   
 Proposition 2: The degree of institutional complexity within a field is indirectly 
 proportional to the level of centralization of the field itself 
 Formal structuring 
 The third field-level dimension taken into account by previous literature, formal 
structuring, refers to whether those demands are formally or informally organized (Meyer et 
al., 1987). More specifically, fields characterized by formally organized interests, sovereigns, 
and constituency groups, has a higher formal structure than environments made up of less 
formally organized groups, communities, or associations (Greenwood et al., 2011; Meyer et 
al., 1987).  
 According to previous literature, it is difficult to predict if greater formalization will 
result in higher or lower institutional complexity (Greenwood et al., 2011). On one hand, 
greater formalization might make different demands more specific, so enabling organizations 
to deal with them in a more calculable manner. However, it may also make pressures coming 
from logics more formalized and coordinated. But, on the other hand, low formalization 
might bring to a lower definition of pressures and, therefore, to an increase of the discretion 
available to organization in dealing with them.  
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 However, following the seminal paper by Meyer and Rowan (1977), the term 
“formal”, even though it was referred to the organizational environment, is undoubtedly 
linked to the idea of more coordination and rationalization. In this sense, it should be possible 
to state that formally organized fields have a clearer differentiation of their groups of 
reference, of the relative interests, goals and rules embedded in logics, and of the relational 
aspects characterizing the field. Therefore, the likelihood to have a greater institutionalization 
of practices and definition of rules is higher respect to less formalized fields, and similarly the 
definition and specificity of logics should be greater. In a more formalized institutional field, 
for example, we can imagine that the interpretation of the different demands and pressures by 
the side of organizations should be more uniform and homogeneous, being them more 
definite in terms of norms and prescriptions. Just because of its superior clarity and certainty 
as regards the different referents’ institutional demands, a formalized field might be 
considered a more elaborate and evolved environment, in the sense that it already knows the 
possible sources of disagreement and conflict.  
 Thus, the more a field is formalized, the more the organization of interests and groups 
belonging to it will be clear. Once got clarity about the different referents present within the 
fragmented field and the pressures that each of them should be able to exercise on the others, 
what we lack is an understanding about the actual ability of the competing institutional 
referents to enforce their demands. This is directly related to the mechanisms of power and 
dominance, which represent in themselves the degree of field’s centralization (Pache & 
Santos, 2010; Scott & Meyer, 1991; Meyer et al., 1987).  
 In this sense, we argue that a highly fragmented field that is particularly likely to 
impose institutional complexity on organizations is one that is low both in formalization and 
centralization. In such fields an higher degree of complexity can be expected to emerge 
because of the existence of unspecified and uncoordinated interests, which, in addition, are 
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the expression of different referents that do not have enough power to clearly dominate the 
field on their own and resolve contradictions and conflict. Some examples are the drug abuse 
treatment centers (D’Aunno et al., 1991), microfinance (Battilana & Dorado, 2010), and 
community banking (Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007).  However, we expect that in a fragmented 
field where the degree of formalization increase, keeping centralization constant, the 
perception of institutional complexity should be lower due to the well-known number of 
different logics, the formalization of their content, and the overall coordination. In fact, 
environments that are more controlled buffer organizations from turbulence (Terreberry 
1968; Emery & Trist 1965).  
 This condition of greater certainty and clarity should reduce the complexity coming 
from the presence of multiple and vague pressures, and enable organizations to deal with 
them in a more computable way.  
    Proposition 3: Keeping the level of centralization constant, the degree of institutional 
 complexity within a fragmented field increases with a decrease in its formal 
 structuring  
 
 ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS  
 In addition to the field’s dimensions analyzed above, which concern the field’s formal 
structure, there are other characteristics, which seem much more intangible and 
indeterminate, that might have an impact on the institutional complexity experienced by 
organizations in the field. Specifically, previous literature has extensively examined the 
effects of multiple institutional logics on complexity, but it has never addressed the fact that 
field’s fragmentation directly implies that different enforcement mechanisms are in play 
(Greenwood et al., 2011). In fact, diverse nodes of authority rely upon different enforcement 
mechanisms, which might have a different power on the way actors conform to their logic of 
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reference. In addition to the structural aspects, a field is characterized by operating rules that 
inevitably vary depending on the circumstances.  
 In this sense, we can imagine fields as characterized by different enforcement 
mechanisms which might allow a diverse degree of discretion, and a diverse power on actors’ 
choices and behaviors. However, extant literature has never addressed how differences in 
fields functioning, in terms of enforcement mechanisms of rules and norms, affect the degree 
of institutional complexity experienced by organizations (Greenwood et al., 2011). Thus, 
institutional logics, as set of broad rules that are socially enforced by field level actors, as 
well as by organizations, make fragmented fields arenas of multiple enforcement mechanisms 
of norms and practices. 
 The basic premise is that each field is characterized by groups of people and 
institutional logics. That being said, we asses that at the bottom of the field functioning there 
are just the rules governing the communities. Being these enforcement mechanisms those that 
lead or should lead any community to adhere to its logic of reference, and being the field just 
characterized by diverse communities and logics, we argue that these mechanisms underlie 
the functioning of the field itself, even influencing the pattern of relationships between the 
different communities. For all these reasons, differences among the enforcement mechanisms 
entail and lead to variance in the operation of fields.  
 Thus, we argue that the enforcement mechanisms can vary according to three main 
dimensions: the form, the strength and the punishment meted out to non conformists. 
 Form 
 The main assumption is based on the view that fragmented institutional fields function 
according to the practices characterizing the different logics they embody. The rules, 
procedures and actual activities implemented by each institutional group conform to the 
prescriptions of the specific logic of reference. Therefore, actors belonging to the same 
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community share the same rules of the game, and pursue the same interests and goals. As 
such, practices, norms and rules “belong” to social groups and must conform to group 
members’ social expectations (Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010). Whether organizational 
legitimacy has traditionally been conceptualized as being derived from the degree to which 
the organization's goals and activities are congruent with broader societal norms, beliefs, and 
values (Parsons 1956; Pfeffer & Salancik 1978; Foreman & Whetten, 2002), at the individual 
level each member belonging to an institutional community tries to gain legitimacy by 
adopting a behavior that is coherent with the prescriptions to which his/her community 
adhere. According to institutional literature, we expect that each member implement actions 
with the aim to be legitimized by his/her group of reference.  
 Taking into account that fragmented fields are characterized by a multiplicity of actors 
and organizations, which are grouped in different communities according to their institutional 
standards and rules, and that the institutional environment not only constraints and directs 
human actions and behaviors through logics, but also allows individuals to act independently 
and to make their own choices (Powell & Colyvas, 2008; Holm, 1995), we argue that the 
different communities within a field are subject to diverse forms of enforcement mechanisms, 
which inevitably prompt them to comply with the prescriptions of their specific logic.  
 The healthcare system, for example, is an organizational field consisting of suppliers 
(health professionals, hospitals and other facilities), resource and product consumers (patients 
or clients), regulatory agencies (government and professional associations) and other 
organizations that produce similar services or products (e.g. alternative medicine) (Reay & 
Hinings, 2009; Currie & Guah, 2007; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). The field is composed by 
various stakeholders including clinicians, assistants, managers, administrators and patients 
and is infused with diverse institutional logics emanating from these different groups. 
Whereas clinicians are regulated by a science logic, based on a quality health care involving 
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innovative diagnostic and therapeutic procedures to ameliorate human suffering and help 
eradicate disease (Dunn & Jones, 2010), managers follow values and practices from the 
private sector, which are oriented to account of cost, efficiency and system rationality 
standards, and administrators follow even different rules, that have a bureaucratic nature and 
are characterized by the compliance to regulation established by the state and local 
government, which have legislative power and control over financial resources. Therefore, 
clinicians, as professionals, secure authority and legitimacy by the side of their community 
from scientific knowledge (Dunn & Jones, 2010; Starr, 1982; Friedson, 1970). In this sense, 
they are pushed to conform to the prescriptions of their institutional group in order to obtain 
peer credibility and recognition and, then, patient satisfaction. Thus, on one hand, the 
enforcement mechanism of rules and standards belonging to physicians’ logic takes the form 
of social legitimization; on the other hand, the enforcement mechanism pushing 
administrative staff to conform to the specific prescriptions contemplated by their logic takes 
the form of regulation observance, coming from the coercive power of governments.  
 Similarly, the academic field is characterized by very different communities of actors, 
with very diverse institutional logics and enforcement mechanisms. As well as in the 
healthcare system, we find a range of stakeholders, such as scientists, administrators, the state 
and local government, who have multiform interests and objectives. Even in this case, the 
forms of the enforcement mechanisms to which each community is subject vary considerably. 
Thus, whereas practices and actions socially legitimized by the Mertonian norms of open 
science (Bercovitz & Feldman, 2008; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), that is based on the 
concept of knowledge disclosure and publications, are enforced by academic scientists in 
order to obtain peer recognition and reputation, those contemplated by a commercial one are 
enforced by administrative managers with the aim to achieve a better performance in terms of 
evaluation indicators that are taken into account by governmental levels. Also in this case, the 
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enforcement mechanisms take a different form: the former is much more based on the 
concept of “shaming”, while the latter on formal regulation. Other examples present in 
previous literature are the coercive power of governments (Greenwood et al., 2010), and the 
normative authority of professional associations and accreditation agencies (Dunn & Jones, 
2010).  
 Therefore, we define the form of the enforcement mechanism “what drives a 
particular community to comply with its institutional logic”. The more the “what” is formal 
(e.g., regulation), the more the form of the enforcement mechanism will be objective. In this 
sense, the form is pertinent to the nature of the enforcement mechanism itself, that is where it 
comes from. Being the form related to the origins and structuring of logics, it might concern 
both written rules and laws, and legitimized but informal behaviors, that shape actors’ 
practices as well as the decision making of organizations.      
 The pronounced difference among the enforcement mechanisms of logics suggests 
that the system of values to which each group refers might vary considerably. Glynn’s (2000) 
study of the Atlanta Symphony Orchestra provides a vivid illustration of the tensions that 
arise from the promotion of competing ideologies by two key internal constituencies. 
Musicians, espousing the “artistic excellence” logic of their profession, sought to develop “a 
world-class orchestra in a world-class city.” Managers, however, promoting the “economic 
utility” ideology they had been trained into, focused on building “the best orchestra . . . [they 
could] afford” (2000: 288). As a result of this competitive commitment, the two groups 
engaged in a passionate battle over what the orchestra’s core competencies were and how its 
resources should be allocated, with musicians emphasizing investment in artistry and 
managers emphasizing cost containment (Pache & Santos, 2010). Different organizational 
groups exhibit “competitive commitment patterns” (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996) that lead 
them to fight against each other to make the template they favor prevail.  
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 Obviously this condition involves conflict over meaning and infrastructure that is 
produced by the activities of field’s participants (Fligstein, 2001). In particular, we argue that 
the relationship among communities conforming to their norms and rules according to 
different motivation is much more complex respect to that among actors sharing the same 
vision. Therefore, logics espousing the virtues of the public sector ethos, professionalism and 
self-regulation, continue to collide with a private sector ethos, which is sanctioned by 
government policy and regulation to enhance performance and efficiency (Currie & Guah, 
2007). In this sense, the complexity experienced by organizations increases whether they are 
part of a field characterized by a multiplicity of communities, which have diverse forms of 
enforcement mechanisms (i.e., based on formal regulation or informal norms) and, therefore, 
different provenience (i.e., public or private).  
 Proposition 4: The degree of institutional complexity perceived by organizations is 
 supposed to increase in those fields where the compliance to institutional logics by the 
 side of diverse communities is enforced by enforcement mechanisms of different 
 form 
 Strength 
 Besides the different forms that the enforcement mechanisms may have, they might 
differ also according to the degree of strength with which they succeed in making different 
groups faithful to their logic of reference. We define the strength of the enforcement 
mechanism “the degree of policing put in place within a community belonging to a specific 
institutional logic within a field”.  
 Much of the discussion around the institutional logic of the academic profession, for 
example, has considered it as a rather homogeneous logic (Dasgupta & David, 1994; Merton, 
1973; Gans, Murray & Stern, wp). But, more recently, we expect considerable heterogeneity 
on actions and behaviors by the side of scientists adhering to it. In particular, within the 
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academic field, the academic profession is driven by a value of freedom, which implies a 
high degree of liberty in choosing which problems to cover and which approach to use in 
dealing with them (Sauermann & Stephan, 2011). This characteristic differentiates 
considerably this community from the others present within the field. Whether, according to 
Merton (1957), the form of the enforcement mechanism of university scientists was based on 
recognition within the scientific community, which emanates from publications in top-tier 
journals, presentations at prestigious conferences, and federal research grants (Siegel, 
Waldman, Atwater and Link, 2004), more recently, faculty members may also have different 
interests, that include personal financial gain and/or a desire to secure additional funding for 
graduate students and laboratory equipment and applied research (Bruneel, D’Este and Salter, 
2010), which deviate from the original institutional logic. We argue that this change has been 
caused exactly by the characteristics of the academic scientists’ logic, and, specifically, by 
the relative low degree of policing implemented within this community, which did not 
enforce their members to comply with the original values of reference in a strong way. 
 Whether we consider that the enforcement mechanisms present within the academic 
profession are based on motivational aspects, attributable to the individual sphere, and that 
the recognition and the observance of practices and values essentially depend on the will of 
each actor, then, it is quite obvious understanding that the strength of these mechanisms is 
softer, due to the fact that the enforcement of the institutional logic is almost autonomous and 
independent from controllers or formal rules. It is worth highlighting that the lower degree of 
policing within the academic profession and the self-regulating nature of the community have 
brought to the development of this logic towards multiform interests and objectives, even 
diverging from the original ones (Sauermann & Stephan, wp). This progressive change has 
increased even more the freedom and the openness present within the profession and, 
50 
 
consequently, has weakened the power of the enforcement mechanisms originally 
legitimated.  
 On the other hand, the other communities present within the field are enforced to 
conform to their institutional logic by mechanisms having a different degree of strength. For 
example, the degree of policing present within the administrative community is much higher 
respect to the one discussed above for academic scientists. In this case, the monitoring put in 
place by authorities with formal power, both internal (i.e. top managers) and external (i.e., 
State and local government) to the community, guarantees the compliance to rules and laws 
in a more accurate way. The bureaucratic form of the enforcement mechanisms makes the 
role of regulators more relevant and significant.   
 Also Greenwood and Suddaby (2006), in their study of the field of professional 
business services in Canada, distinguished between formal rules conveyed and enforced 
through coercive processes, and internalized cognitive schemes diffused through normative 
socialization. For accountants in the field, it mattered that their actions be approved by the 
profession, but, and this is a key point, the regulatory power of the profession remained 
geographically fixed at the provincial level. Provincial associations review the quality of 
audit work performed by their members and are responsible for enforcing conformity to 
institutionalized practices (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006). This is the big difference between 
academic scientists and accountants communities. Even though both the groups refer “the 
importance of upholding the integrity of the profession” (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006), the 
former is characterized by an institutional logic that is based on the progressive 
internalization and institutionalization of norms and practices evolving over time, while the 
latter is much more dependent on the object of regulation and powerful regulators. Being the 
strength of the enforcement mechanisms of the academic profession lower than it is within 
other communities, academic scientists are less constrained by institutional, legitimated 
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processes and more open to alternative interests. 
 It is difficult to foresee the effect that a greater or lower strength of the mechanisms 
enforcing the different communities to conform to their institutional logic has on the degree 
of institutional complexity perceived by organizations within the field. It is possible to state 
that a strong enforcement mechanism makes the deviation from the logic of reference more 
unlikely by the side of each community’s member. This implies that fields characterized by 
institutional logics observing strong enforcement mechanisms have a more determinate and 
specified structure.  
 Proposition 5: A strong degree of policing exerted within the different
 communities makes the institutional field more formally structured   
 Proposition 6: Whether a greater degree of  policing is supposed to lead to a more 
 formal structured field, then organizations in those fields are more likely to experience 
 a lower degree of complexity.    
 Punishment  
 In inter-organizational relations, and more generally in organizational fields, actors 
suffer social penalties because they threaten reigning interpretive frameworks (Zuckerman, 
1999). Starting from this premise, the last aspect characterizing the enforcement mechanisms 
present in a field is that of the punishment meted out to non-conformists. We define the 
punishment provided by the enforcement mechanisms as “the infliction of hard treatment by 
an authority on a person or group of people for his/her/thier prior failing in some respect 
(usually an infraction of a rule, norms or practice)” (Feinberg, 1970). Thus, punishment is a 
conventional device for the expressions of attitudes of resentment and indignation, and of 
judgments of disapproval and reprobation, on the part of those inflicting the punishment. For 
this reason the most important significance of punishment is the symbolic one (Feinberg, 
1970).      
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 According to institutional literature, the threat of being denied should induce actors 
and organizations to adopt accepted procedures and practices to avoid the punishment for 
deviating from legitimated behaviors. But, rather than demonstrate that defying classification 
invites penalties, scholars tend to point to the homogeneity of practice and take this as 
evidence that defection is punished. It is thus interesting to note the idea that actors are 
constrained by accepted models (Zuckerman, 1999), which lead them to conform to norms 
and practices recognized and legitimized within their community. In this sense, the 
mechanisms present within each community, working with the aim to enforce the 
prescriptions considered by the institutional logic of reference, may contemplate a 
punishment method for actors deviating from socially accepted rules (Greenwood et al., 
2011; Rao, Monin & Durand, 2003; Zuckerman, 1999). Even though institutional literature 
has recognized that illegitimacy is costly and that communities adhering to specific 
institutional logics are sensitive to the pressures for complying with legitimate roles 
(Zuckerman, 1999), the evidence of negative consequences caused by illegitimacy is scant.   
 Previous literature has explicitly dealt with some cases of punishment meted out for 
unacknowledged behaviors. Zuckerman (1999), for example, in analyzing the American 
stock market, as a “mediated market” in which third parties act as critics shaping market 
patterns through product recommendations and endorsements, explores the social processes 
that produce punishment for illegitimate role performance. This is a clear case of withdrawal 
of legitimacy caused by illegitimate behavior. Similarly, Quinn-Trank and Washington 
(2009) spoke about the loss of legitimacy in the business education field. Another kind of 
punishment might be that of firing people not respectful of rules and laws to which the 
community comply with. It is more likely to observe this kind of punishment in communities 
where the enforcement of legitimate practices and norms is dependent on the coercive power 
of formal authority or on the observance of formal laws enacted by State or local government.  
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Even marketing theory focuses on similar issues using the framework of product categories. 
This literature suggests that a seller must offer products that conform to accepted types lest 
such offerings be screened out of consideration as incomparable to others (e.g., Shocker, 
Akiva, Boccara & Nedungadi, 1991; Urban, Weinberg, and Hauser 1996). 
 In any case, those actors diverging from expected, recognized behavior engage in 
what Cassell (1993) refers to as the ‘tricky business of “trying on”’ these institutional logics: 
adapting and modifying them to fit their own purposes. Recently, the institutional 
entrepreneurship stream of research has been presented as an alternative to the deterministic 
images of isomorphism where actors reactively adopt diverse practices and structures because 
of a desire to avoid uncertainty, sanction or a loss of legitimacy (Lawrence & Phillips, 2004).  
What it would be interesting to empirically explore is the different effectiveness that 
punishment methods may have on complexity within a field.  
 In particular, it can be conceived that the more a punishment method is strong in terms 
of delegitimating effects for actors, the more likely is that actors’ behavior will conform to 
existing practices, rules and understandings. In this sense, we argue that the punishment 
expected to actors deviating from institutional logic affects the way institutional complexity 
is perceived at the field level. A field made up of different logics, all having strong and 
effective punishment methods, should be characterized by lower conflict and change.  
 Proposition 7: Enforcement mechanisms with effective punishment methods are 
 supposed to decrease the degree of institutional complexity perceived by 
 organizations  within fields, by reducing conflict and change 
   -------------------------------------------------------- 
    Insert Figure 2 about here 
   -------------------------------------------------------- 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 The theoretical framework developed in this paper has important implications for 
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research into institutional complexity and fields. The first implication is the importance of 
considering the infrastructure of the institutional context when examining the dynamics of 
complexity coming from the multiplicity of belief systems and norms. We have argued that 
the experience of institutional complexity is fundamentally shaped by specific dimensions 
which characterize the field of reference. Thus, to fully understand the variance of the degree 
of complexity among fields, we believe it is fundamental to examine the characteristics of the 
fields themselves.  
 Moreover, research related to institutional complexity has been mainly focused on 
analyzing the relationship between logics, always trying to understand how they combine and 
reconfigure in new or hybrid version. But, the relation between complexity and field is still 
lagging behind (Greenwood et al., 2011). Therefore, the second implication of the paper is 
the importance of going more in depth in analyzing complexity through the field, taking into 
account not only its formal structure, but also its functioning. Indeed, previous scholars have 
examined the effect of some structural field dimensions on institutional complexity, 
overlooking all the aspects attaining to the operational mechanisms. This points out that the 
knowledge and the investigation of these dimensions by the side of organizations might allow 
a greater effectiveness in their response to institutional complexity. 
 The third implication of this work attains to the possibility for future research to 
compare different institutional fields. So far, we did not have a framework to do that 
analytically. Our attempt here is also to provide a model to advance our knowledge on this 
topic. In this sense, it would be interesting to use the proposed framework to compare fields 
with different characteristics in order to test what comes out.       
 Overall, we have drawn on a variety of cognate literature as well as published work on 
institutional logics, complexity and organizational fields to develop a framework to guide 
future research on better understanding the relationship between fields and multiple logics. 
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Given the lack of research on the topic, it is highly suggested to proceed with empirical 
works, in order to refine and elaborate the proposed model.     
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1. The field 
 
THE ORGANIZATIONAL 
FIELD IS DESCRIBED IN 
TERMS OF: 
CONCEPTS DEFINITIONS CITATIONS 
THE ORGANIZATIONS  
The field is a set of organizations 
that in the aggregate constitute an 
area of institutional life 
Greenwood & Suddaby (2006);  
Lawrence & Phillips (2004);  
Greenwood, Suddaby & Hinings (2002); 
DiMaggio & Powell (1983);  
Porac, Thomas & Baden-Fuller (1989) 
THE SET OF INSTITUTIONAL 
LOGICS  
The field is characterized by 
organizations that participate in the 
same meaning system, are defined 
by similar symbolic processes, and 
are subject to common regulatory 
rules 
Reay & Hinings (2009);  
Greenwood & Suddaby (2006);  
Lawrence & Phillips (2004);  
Scott (1994);  
Whittington (1992);  
Zucker (1987, 1977);  
Giddens (1984);  
Berger & Luckman (1967);   
THE INTERRELATIONSHIP 
AMONG THEM 
The field is a network, or a 
configuration of, objective relations 
between positions  
Reay & Hinings (2009, 2005);  
Lawrence & Phillips (2004);  
Lawrence (1999);  
Hardy (1994);  
Bourdieu & Wacquant (1992);  
White (1992);  
Briant & Karabel (1991);  
Clegg (1989);  
Gray (1989);  
Giddens (1984) 
 Figure 1. The dynamic of institutional complexity
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 Figure 2. The theoretical framework 
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Organizations are increasingly exposed to a multiplicity of demands and pressures imposed 
by their institutional environments. This condition of institutional complexity makes activities 
difficult to carry on and consensus impossible to achieve. However, not all organizations 
experience institutional complexity to the same degree or are as successful in managing 
complexity. Prior research has suggested that some organizational and field characteristics 
affect the way in which organizations shape strategic responses to institutional complexity. 
Data from a multiple, comparative case study of three different types of organizations 
involved in technology transfer activities between university and industry, show which 
strategies are more likely to lead an organization to respond more or less successfully to a 
situation of institutional complexity. We uncover three main strategies that explain the 
variation of success: having boundary spanners, mirroring institutional demands and buffering 
institutional logics. This study contributes to the institutional logics perspective by showing 
how institutional complexity might be successfully managed within the organization.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Institutional pluralism; Organizational strategies; Technology transfer; Case study.    
                                                             
†
 Department of Management, University of Bologna, elisa.villani4@unibo.it  
‡ Imperial College Business School, n.phillips@imperial.ac.uk 
70 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 Institutional logics are taken-for-granted rules that regulate action by furnishing 
“assumptions and values, usually implicit, about how to interpret organizational reality, what 
constitutes appropriate behavior, and how to succeed” (Thornton, 2004). In particular, they 
provide social actors with formal and informal rules of action and interaction, cultural norms 
and beliefs for interpretation, and implicit principles about what constitute legitimate goals 
and how they may be achieved (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Scott, 1994; Thornton & Ocasio, 
1999). Although institutional logics, as guidelines describing the “way a particular social 
world works” (Jackall, 1988), may constitute an useful tool for understanding how a 
particular field is structured and organized, there is a growing recognition in the neo-
institutional literature that organizational and societal settings are more and more exposed to 
different institutional prescriptions contemporaneously (Greenwood et al., 2011; Dunn & 
Jones, 2010; Pache & Santos, 2010; Greenwood et al., 2010; Reay & Hinings, 2009; Kraatz & 
Block, 2008).  
 Organizations experience institutional complexity every time they have to handle the 
divergent interests, goals and practices coming from multiple institutional logics (Greenwood 
et al., 2011). Hospitals and health care organizations (D’Aunno et al., 1991; D’Aunno et al., 
2000; Reay & Hinings, 2005; Reay & Hinings, 2009), university departments (Nelson, 2005), 
arts organizations (Alexander, 1996), non-profit and social organizations (Dutton & Dukerich, 
1991; Pache & Santos, 2010; Tracey, Phillips & Jarvis, 2010) and public schools (Rowan, 
1982) are all examples of organizations facing institutional environments that exert pluralistic 
demands. In short, each of these organizations is “so many different things to so many 
different people that it must, of necessity, be partially at war with itself” (Kerr, 1963; see also 
Kraatz & Block, 2008). 
 To date, however, much of institutional theory has been involved in explaining the 
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role that dominant institutional logics play in promoting conformity within fields and 
organizations (Tracey et al., 2010). Organizations have been widely recognized as “entities 
reproducing a single coherent institutional template in order to gain legitimacy and secure 
support from external institutional referents” (Pache & Santos, 2012; see also DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983). Only recently, some works have tried to give more attention to situations 
where organizations are affected by institutional complexity and to present different 
configurations of multiple logics coexistence within the same organization (Pache & Santos, 
2012; Goodrick & Reay, 2011; Greenwood et al., 2011). For example, Goodrick and Reay 
(2011) presented “dominant logic”, “competition”, and “ongoing coexistence”, as three 
different conceptualizations for institutional complexity, and Pache and Santos (2012) spoke 
about “decoupling”, “compromising”, and “combination”, as strategies deployed by hybrid 
organizations to respond to multiple institutional pressures. However, if we know something 
about organizational responses to competing multiple logics, what is still missing is a clear 
understanding of why some organizations are more able to cope with institutional complexity 
than others. In particular, what determines organizational success in responding to 
institutional complexity? Which strategies lead some organizations to face pluralistic 
demands in a more successful way compared to others?  
 It is important to answer these questions, not only because they provide a deeper 
understanding of the relationship between institutional complexity and organizational features 
(Greenwood et al., 2011), but also because they offer novel insight into how organizations 
should act to achieve greater success in blending pluralistic prescriptions. We believe that 
looking at this unexplored aspect within the institutional logics approach will deepen our 
knowledge about the micro-foundations of institutional logics by linking actions and 
behaviors with organizational strategies and organizational success in managing multiple 
institutional logics.         
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 To do so, we conducted a comparative case study of three different types of 
organizations (six organizations in total) carrying out technology transfer activities in Italy: 
Technology Transfer Offices (TTOs), University Incubators (UIs), and University-Industry 
Consortia (UIC). These organizations combined two previously separate institutional logics: 
an “academic” logic, that is mainly focused on basic research, and a “market” logic, focused 
on financial returns, that are connected to applied research and development (Merton & 
Storer, 1973). These are the reasons why we chose this context and, more precisely, the 
Italian one. As organizations that incorporate diverse logics, TTOs, UIs and UBC all have to 
handle prescriptions and pressures caused by different norms and rules and, therefore, to face 
the problem of institutional complexity. In the context of this study, we analyze how these 
different organizations respond to multiple logics, shedding light on the different strategies 
they deploy. More specifically, we want to gain an understanding of how their specific 
decisions and actions can lead to more or less success in coping with pluralistic demands. We 
focus on the variation of organizational strategies and the degree of success, with the aim of 
analyzing how they are related and which combination of organizational actions is more 
likely to lead to the successful management of institutional complexity.  
 In answering our research question we made two key contributions. First, we respond 
to a recent call by Greenwood and colleagues (2011) to empirically confirm that organizations 
experience institutional complexity to varying degrees. While prior studies have emphasized 
more episodic “responses” to institutional complexity (Greenwood et al., 2011; Pache & 
Santos, 2010), we moved beyond and found that the degree of success achieved by the 
organization in confronting institutional complexity is dependent on the strategies that the 
organization use in coping with multiple logics. In finding that, we develop institutional 
theory by furnishing new insights about institutional complexity. 
 Second, we give further insight into micro-level action (Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997) by 
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better understanding how actors’ decisions and actions affect the management of competing 
institutional expectations. Institutional analysis has always been insistent on the need to 
analyze the top-down effect of institutional pressure, such as that emanating from logics to 
behavior within the organization (Greenwood et al., 2011; Pache & Santos, 2012). Our 
findings have general implications for understanding how organizational actions may impact 
on the way institutional complexity is perceived and institutional logics are managed within 
the organization. Moreover, as management implications concerns, findings could be useful to 
the organization’s top management for better understanding which kind of strategies might be 
implemented in situation of never ending institutional complexity. 
 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS AND COMPLEXITY  
 Institutional logics, as taken-for-granted, resilient social prescriptions, specify the 
boundaries of a field, its rules of membership, the role identities and the appropriate 
organizational forms of its constituent communities (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Thornton, 
2004; Lawrence, 1999; Friedland et al., 1991). They are the “broader cultural templates that 
provide organizational actors with means-ends designations, as well as organizing principles” 
(Pache & Santos, 2010; see also Friedland & Alford, 1991). The first definition of 
institutional logics was given by Friedland and Alford (1991), who referred to logics as sets of 
“material practices and symbolic constructions”, by which actors and organizations produce 
and reproduce their material experiences and render them meaningful (Thornton & Ocasio, 
2008). Thornton and Ocasio (1999) refer to logics as “the formal and informal rules of action, 
interaction, and interpretation that guide and constrain decision makers”. If we consider that 
institutional logics provide social actors with vocabularies of motives and senses of self 
(Friedland et al., 1991), then, they not only direct what social actors want (i.e., interests) and 
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how they are to proceed (i.e., guidelines for action), but also who or what they are (i.e., 
identity) (Lok, 2010). 
 So far, the prevailing theoretical conceptualization has linked institutional logics to the 
concepts of conformity and stability. This has meant that extant literature has tended to 
emphasize the fact that organizations are shaped and affected by a dominant logic, which 
drives them towards isomorphic responses (Lounsbury, 2007; Greenwood et al., 2010). As we 
know, organizations try to gain legitimacy by producing and reproducing rules and norms of a 
single coherent institutional logic, trough repeated interactions of these taken-for-granted 
prescriptions. In this sense, their first objective would be that of gaining legitimacy from the 
field they belong to and developing common understanding about rules and values of the 
dominant template they recognize (Phillips, Lawrence & Hardy, 2000; Thornton & Ocasio, 
2008; Reay & Hinings, 2009). Even when a phenomenon of logic change has been 
acknowledged (Hoffman, 1999; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; Thornton, Jones & Kury, 2005), it 
has been presented as a temporary instability, where a shifting from one dominant framework 
to another occurred (Reay & Hinings, 2009). In this sense, scholars, who have focused on 
changes in logics, have conceptualized them as a replacement circumstance, instead of a 
situation of incoherence between multiple institutional pressures, and have simplified them as 
a period effects, instead of an enduring phenomenon of friction between different groups of 
individuals within the same organization (Dunn & Jones, 2010).  
 Although the idea of an institutional logic may be an useful tool to perceive and better 
know which norms and rules characterize a particular field, a second phase of the institutional 
logic approach has appeared in recent years with the idea that organizations can be exposed to 
different institutional demands at the same time (Greenwood et al., 2011; Kraatz & Block, 
2008). Actually, this new direction is coherent with the first conceptualization of institutional 
logics given by Friedland & Alford (1991), who clearly stated that organizational fields are 
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always subject to multiple logics (Greenwood et al., 2010). Indeed, the idea of “contradictory 
practices and beliefs” (Friedland & Alford, 1991), whereby “multiple logics may coexist by 
segmenting their impact on different actors, geographical communities, or types of 
organizations” (Goodrick & Reay, 2011), has been explicitly asserted from the very 
beginning. The attention paid to institutional pluralism and complexity has increased and a 
growing number of scholars have begun to better explore and deepen the theoretical and 
practical implications of this condition. Institutional research has shifted attention away from 
the idea of isomorphic diffusion to develop more coherent approaches to study organizational 
variation and change (Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007; Kraatz & Moore, 2002). This move has 
opened the door to new issues embedded in the concept of institutional complexity, that are 
“the potential for fragmentation, incoherence, conflict, goal-ambiguity, and organizational 
instability” (Kraatz & Block, 2008). Such new interest arose from the fact that scholars have 
begun to address the role of non-dominant logics (Goodrick & Reay, 2011). In this paper we 
use the term institutional complexity to refer to situations in which a multiplicity of logics, 
exerting different pressures and influences, are in play in a particular context.  
 So, organizations incorporating elements from different institutional logics (Battilana 
& Dorado, 2010; Pache & Santos, 2012) face the effects of that institutional complexity and 
“contend with competing external demands and internal identities” (Jay, forthcoming). Kraatz 
and Block (2008) said that organizations operating within multiple institutional spheres “play 
in two or more games at the same time” (Kraatz & Block, 2008). Considering that multiple 
logics embodied by the organization are independent, not always compatible, and often in 
conflict (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Pache & Santos, 2012; Greenwood et al., 2011), 
organizations face heightened challenges in trying to incorporate these antagonistic practices 
(Pache & Santos, 2012; Tracey et al., 2010). However, although the extant literature has 
recognized institutional complexity being a problem for most of the organizations in their 
76 
 
attempt to find a proper response, “it can be argued that organizations experience institutional 
complexity to varying degrees, depending on their formal and informal characteristics” 
(Greenwood et al., 2011). Therefore, it follows that organizations will differ in their responses 
to complexity and these responses will differ in their effectiveness.   
 CONCEPTUALIZATIONS FOR INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEXITY 
 Overall, three main conceptualizations for institutional complexity have been 
acknowledged in previous literature (Pache & Santos, 2012; Goodrick & Reay, 2011), each of 
them specifying a different degree of balance among logics. The most unbalanced situation is 
displayed either where behaviors and actions are entirely guided by one dominant logic 
(Lounsbury, 2002; Thornton, 2002; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999), or where a decoupling 
between normative and operational structure occurs (Bromley & Powell, 2012; Boxenbaum & 
Jonsson, 2008; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; see also Pache & Santos, 2012). In the second 
situation, long-term tension between multiple logics until one of them wins becomes the new 
template (Reay & Hinings, 2005; Hensman, 2003), and a compromise strategy, where 
institutional prescriptions are enacted in a balanced form (Kraatz & Block, 2008; Oliver, 
1991; see also Pache & Santos, 2012), have been observed. For example, Reay and Hinings 
(2005) explored how Alberta health care system achieved a new form of stability and re-
institutionalization, after a period of deep competition, where the government attempted to 
move the field from a medical professionalism logic to a new business-like health care, and 
physicians disagreed with this change. Similarly, Meyer and Hammerschmid (2006) explored 
the shift from a legalistic-bureaucratic logic to a managerial one in the public sector in 
Austria.  
 A recent stream of research has highlighted a third conceptualization for institutional 
complexity, suggesting that “coexisting and competing institutional logics do not always 
resolve” (Goodrick et al., 2011), but might be combined (Greenwood et al., 2011; Battilana & 
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Dorado, 2010; Reay & Hinings, 2009). In those situations, diverse logics remains associated 
with different actors, units, communities, and so on (Greenwood et al., 2010; Lounsbury, 
2007), or they enact a combination of activities drawn from multiple logics in order to secure 
support from the widest range of actors (Pache & Santos, 2012). For example, Battilana and 
Dorado (2010), as an example of logics combination, in their comparative study of 
microfinance organizations suggested that to be sustainable organizations have to create a 
common organizational identity that strikes a balance between the logics they combine. 
Professional work has been analyzed by Dunn and Jones (2010) and Goodrick and Reay 
(2011) as a context in which norms and practices appeared to be shaped by multiple 
institutional norms. The recent paper by Pache and Santos (2012) added a fourth response – 
selective decoupling – to institutional complexity. This strategy involves a “selective coupling 
of intact demands drawn from each logics” (Pache & Santos, 2012), which is the result of a 
purposeful enactment of selected practices among a pool of competing alternatives.  
 INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEXITY AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS  
 Along with different responses to multiple logics, recent works have also tried to find 
a relationship between particular organizational characteristics and the way organizations 
confront institutional complexity. Indeed, the characteristics of the organization can make 
organizations particularly sensitive to certain logics and less to others (Greenwood et al., 
2011). The structural position of an organization in the field (Greenwood et al., 2011; Kraatz, 
1998; Leblebici et al., 1991; Davis, 1991), the power and influence that groups with different 
logics have within an organization, both in terms of ownership and governance (Greenwood 
et al., 2011; Pache and Santos, 2010; Lounsbury, 2001; Goodrick & Salancik, 1996; Dobbin 
et al., 1993), the problem of multiple identities that actors bring from diverse fields within the 
organization (Greenwood et al., 2011; Battilana & Dorado, 2010; King et al., 2010; Dutton et 
al., 2009; Kraatz & Block, 2008; Glynn, 2008) are all aspects that have been stressed in 
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previous studies. 
 Important reference papers, in this sense, are those by Greenwood and colleagues 
(2011) and Pache and Santos (2010). The former developed an analytical framework for 
connecting institutional complexity, field structure, and organizational attributes to final 
organizational responses. In this framework, organizational features are presumed as filters of 
how institutional logics are framed and experienced within the organization. In particular, 
these characteristics frame how organizations “perceive and construct the repertoire of 
responses” (Greenwood et al., 2011) available to institutional pluralism. Field position, 
structure, ownership/governance, and identity are identify as the most important filters. 
Depending on these attributes, they identified two possible typologies of responses to multiple 
institutional pressures, which differ according to whether they focus upon organizational 
strategies or organizational structures. Whereas those referring to strategies considers power 
distribution and decoupling, those resting upon organizational structures are drawn from 
ambidexterity literature and are classified in “blended” or “structurally differentiated” 
hybrids. Whereas blended hybrids try to combine practices coming from different logics 
within a single organization (Reay & Hinings, 2009; Gulbrandsen, 2011; Battilana & Dorado, 
2010), structurally differentiate hybrids compartmentalize an organization into subunits, each 
of them responding to different practices, norms and mindset. This is similar to the concept of 
“compartmentalization”, which Pratt and Foreman (2000) refer to for depicting situations in 
which organizations “choose to preserve all current identities but not seek to attain any 
synergy among them” (Pratt et al., 2000). Pache and Santos (2010), in a similar vein, 
proposed a theoretical model of organizational responses to conflicting institutional demands 
as a function of the nature of the conflict (i.e., organizations’ goals and means), and the intra-
organizational representation of that conflict. In this sense, they identified four different 
typologies of responses, that are the result of different power balance within organizations 
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facing conflicting institutional pressures.  
 However, we still lack an exhaustive explanation of the phenomenon, especially for 
different organizations and the different results they obtain in terms of the management of 
institutional complexity. In this sense, we know that organizational responses to institutional 
complexity are unlikely to be uniform (Greenwood et al., 2010), but we do not know which 
kind of decision and actions might be more successful for managing institutional pluralism, 
and in particular, which strategies allow an organization to be more effective than others in 
coping with multiple institutional pressures. Examining this stream of literature, it is clear that 
the link between organizational characteristics, strategies and institutional pluralism is quite 
close. But, which strategies make an organization more successful than another in responding 
to institutional complexity? Our study is directed at moving forward the ongoing conversation 
on institutional complexity, following the above line of research.  
 INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEXITY AND STRATEGIC DECISION  
 The exposure to multiple, often conflicting, institutional logics requires organizations 
to exercise some level of strategic decision (Pache & Santos, 2010; Dorado, 2005; Clemens & 
Cook, 1999; Fredrickson & Alford, 1991). Strategic choice, as “a unified, comprehensive, and 
integrated plan designed to ensure that the basic objectives of the enterprise are achieved” 
(Glueck, 1980), is strictly linked to the responses that organizations might give to particular 
situations of institutional complexity. The presence of institutional pluralism makes 
organizational actors aware of alterative possibilities, therefore spurring them to make choices 
about prioritization and satisfaction of different demands and pressures. Strategy, as decisions 
and actions that regulate which issues and problems become more important within the 
organization and the way they are managed, represents an important object of analysis for 
better understanding the “struggle” among logics and the final response to institutional 
complexity. In particular, following previous literature, we state that norms, prescriptions, and 
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practices prescribed by different institutional logics tend to accomplish diverse objectives and 
satisfy diverse interests. In this sense, the organizational strategies that an organization 
deploys to face these contradictory demands are extremely important, in order to understand 
which responses might be implemented and the degree of success that each of them may 
achieve.  
 Given that not all the organizations experience institutional complexity in a similar 
way, “since field-level institutional processes are filtered and enacted differently by different 
organizations” (Pache & Santos, 2010; see also Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Lounsbury, 
2001), we agree that the strategies that organizations deploy depict the way they handle the 
pressures and demands coming from external stakeholders (Greenwood et al., 2011; Pache et 
al., 2010; Kraatz et al., 2008). In this sense, organizational strategies are exactly the ones that 
“frame how organizations experience institutional complexity and how they perceive and 
construct the repertoire of responses available to them” (Greenwood et al., 2011). We find 
previous research, in institutional theory, addressing the important role played by different 
organizational characteristics in responding to multiple logics, but we don’t have a clear and 
comprehensive contribution about the way in which strategies shape the success that an 
organization can achieve in coping with this situation. 
 As such, our study is motivated by the following research question: what strategies do 
organizations adopt to deal with institutional complexity and what determine how successful 
these strategies are in responding to institutional complexity? 
 
3. METHODS 
 In order to answer our research question, we conducted an inductive multiple case 
study of organizations dealing with technology transfer between university and industry in 
Italy. We use a comparative case study approach (Eisenhardt, 1989), in which each case is 
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treated as an independent experiment (Yin, 2003), that corroborates emerging theoretical 
insights. In order to reduce potential biases associated with single case, our study focused also 
on variation within cases, taking into account different organizations of the same typology. 
This allows for a more rigorous analysis, not only in terms of reliability and richness, but also 
in terms of theory generalizability (Eisenhardt, 1989). Miles and Huberman (1994) said that 
multiple cases “add confidence to findings”.  
 Specifically, the research setting we refer to is composed of those organizations that 
have been established in Italy as a result of the recent openness towards the exploitation of 
research results for industrial ends in university-industry collaboration. Considering the 
important changes occurring in this field, and the multiplicity of interaction forms that have 
been recently set up by academia and industry, the setting is ideal for addressing our research 
questions. We, present below the field, along with the main recent changes in legislation, and 
how data were collected and analyzed. 
 RESEARCH SETTING  
 We studied technology transfer between university and industry in Italy. Technology 
transfer is a very complex field, where different typologies of organizations and multiple 
actors are involved. Here, we focus on the following key parties: university scientists, who 
discover new technologies, industrial managers, having the task of commercializing 
university-based technologies, and, specifically, intermediate organizations, which serve as 
liaisons between academic scientists and industry. All six organizations in our sample achieve 
their goals by bringing into contact academia and industry, in order to transfer and exploit 
academic results for commercial purposes. Therefore, on one hand, they need to display 
appropriateness toward a web of referents embedded in a belief system that we refer to here as 
the academic logic. Indeed, they interact with academic researchers and discuss with them 
their research output and its commercialization. On the other hand, given their reliance on 
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industrial word for the effectiveness of technology transfer process, they need to display 
appropriateness to industrial partners who are embedded in a market logic. For academics, all 
these organizations represent an alternative and complementary way for raising funds, and a 
mean to develop applied research. For firms, these organizations are potentially attractive 
vehicles to establish in-depth collaboration with university, providing access to state-of-the-
art knowledge in specific fields of interest. In this sense, all these organizations represent a 
context where at least two different institutional logics are in the running 
 Organizations operating in this sector are quite new in Italy, considering that the first 
significant steps in this direction, in terms of legislation, occurred only in the late 90s. 
However, the last twenty years have been crucial for the Italian university system as a whole. 
New reforms, aiming at improving the transfer of research results to industry, have brought 
important consequences both for university and enterprises. In particular, before the last 
important reform in 2001, Italy has been the object of important legislative changes, that have 
tried to instill, within universities, a new culture that is more open towards collaboration and 
cooperation with industry. In Table 1 we report a timeline of the most important legislative 
changes occurred in Italy between 1989 and 2004  
   -------------------------------------------------------- 
    Insert Table 1 about here 
   -------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 The structural changes made to the set of norms and rules governing universities’ 
activities and public patents right have deeply affected the creation of TTOs (along with the 
other forms) and resulted in an exponential increase from the mid-2000s. Today, after almost 
a decade, we see a variation in the way university and industry interact, both in terms of 
organizational forms (e.g., TTOs, UIs, and UBC) and strategies deployed. We also observe a 
variation in the degree of success that those organizations score in managing the different 
objectives and interests of the two worlds. 
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 SAMPLING OF ORGANIZATIONS 
 We rested on a sampling design at two stages. The first step concerned the choice of 
the organizational types, the second the selection of the organizations belonging to the same 
type. This process allowed us to account for both variation between and within cases, in order 
to produce a richer and more accurate theory. As regards the first stage, in order to determine 
the different types of organizations involved in technology transfer activities in Italy, we have 
identified, with the help of key informants in the field, two main variables that will drive us in 
creating a matrix with the most relevant types.  
   -------------------------------------------------------- 
    Insert Table 2 about here 
   -------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 On the horizontal line we have the variable “field of origin”, and on the vertical line 
we have the “positioning” dimension. While with “field of origin”, we mean that 
organizations working on technology transfer can originate from one or multiple 
environments from the beginning, with “positioning”, we intend that those organizations can 
take shape, physically, inside or outside the regulating mechanisms of one specific field of 
reference. This exercise to identify a priori key dimensions for differentiating the typologies 
of organizations, represented the attempt to define the boundaries of the institutional fields of 
reference. More specifically, also following our informants opinions, we expect that these 
variables affected the interaction between logics and the expression of them. In sum, on the 
horizontal line we have that organizations may be established by one institutional 
environment, with an open task from the very beginning, or directly by the agreement of 
multiple fields. On the vertical line, we find that some organizations physically stay inside 
one of the contexts of origin, whereas others are completely detached. Following the matrix 
below, we have found four main typologies of organizations, which we consider the most 
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relevant ones for managing technology transfer activities between academia and industrial 
world.  
 Regarding the first phase, we decided to focus on three of them and, specifically, on 
TTOs, UIs and UIC. The choice was mainly driven by two factors: 1) the diffusion of the 
identified types throughout the country; 2) the easiness of data access. Concerning the second 
phase, we selected our organizations according to their “geographical location” and their 
actual involvement in technology transfer activities. Specifically, taking into account that in 
Italy each city with a college has at most one TTO, with very few exceptions, we began our 
selection from TTOs, in order to identify the suitable contexts to take into account. As regards 
“geographical location”, we selected them looking at the industrial context, in order to avoid 
the choice of very different locations in terms of entrepreneurial activities characteristics, such 
as firms’ size and productivity. Therefore, we decided that the first TTO had to be picked out 
in the north-west of Italy and the second in the central part. Once identified these suitable 
settings, we proceeded by looking at the second measure. Their actual involvement in 
technology transfer has been evaluated according to the activity they have carried on during 
their life. So, once selected the two TTOs, we proceeded in sampling the other six 
organizations (two UIC and two UIs), exactly in the same cities of the TTOs in order to 
minimize bias related to external, environmental characteristics. Finally, we got three matched 
pairs, that permitted 1) to replicate cases of the same organizational typology (variation within 
cases), in order to account of all significant information and improve the generalizability of 
inducted theory, and 2) to compare the characteristics of the different organizational forms 
(variation between cases), to explore our theoretical issue.  
   -------------------------------------------------------- 
    Insert Table 3 about here 
   -------------------------------------------------------- 
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 In terms of choosing respondents, we followed the guidelines given by Lincoln and 
Guba's (1985) regarding "purposeful sampling". We first selected informants that would be 
most able to inform us regarding our theoretical interest (Corley and Gioia, 2004), since they 
were directly involved in decision-making processes and strategies deployment. Then we 
asked each informants to suggest other people who would have been useful in giving us 
information about the issue of interest. Considering the focus of our research, the sampling 
began with the organizations’ top managers, since they are considered by previous research 
(Pratt and Foreman, 2000; Corley and Gioia, 2004) as those people most knowledgeable 
about and influent in organizational decisions. Then, the choice of other informants, within 
the organizations, was based on their recommendations and guidelines.  
 Regarding the sampling of academic researchers and industrial CEOs, we asked for 
their names to the informants sampled within the organizations. In particular, we tried to 
follow two main criteria and we asked for 1) academics/CEOs who had been really involved 
in technology transfer projects, independently of the final result; 2) academics/CEOs who had 
been involved in these kind of activities no more than six months ago. The selection based on 
these criteria guaranteed to sample people who actually came in contact with different 
institutional logics and whose experience was in the recent past, in order to minimize 
retrospective bias and enhance data truthfulness.  
 In reporting findings below, we will use codes in order to preserve the anonymity of 
organizations and people. 
 RANKING ORGANIZATIONS IN “MORE” AND “LESS” SUCCESSFUL  
 In order to answer to our theoretical questions, we ordered the sampled organizations 
in “more successful” and “less successful” in dealing with institutional complexity. The most 
important premise concerns the fact that all our organizations are involved in highly complex 
activities. It was just the definition of success and the measurement of its degree that took us 
86 
 
up during this phase. To do this, we came along different attempts of conceptualization. At 
the beginning we tried to classify the sampled organizations in “more” or “less” successful in 
dealing with multiple logics basing on the assessment about the performance they achieved in 
carrying out their activities. We asked our informants, within the organizations, to respond to 
the following questions: 1) “What is the main goal of your organization?”, 2) “Which kind of 
measures does the organization use to evaluate its performance?”, and 3) “Do you have a 
synthetic indicator for measuring performance?”. Whereas some organizations aim at 
widening the patent portfolio, others tried to maximize the number of licenses or the ratio of 
licenses to patents applications, and others were focused on the number of spin-offs or the 
number of completed projects. Therefore, even though they all confronted issues associated 
with multi-logics pressures, specifically they focused on quite different goals that makes it 
difficult to comparison based on objective measures. Moreover, those organizations add value 
to the dynamics of technology transfer through very difficult quantifiable activities. So, on 
one hand, due to the inexistence of specific and comprehensive indicators, on the other hand, 
due to the impossibility to find an indicator suitable for all the organizational typologies, it 
was impossible to follow this path, which tried to connect the success achieved in dealing 
with institutional complexity with the overall performance reached by an organization.  
 For these reasons, we decided to proceed with another approach, based on the 
evaluation that academic researchers and industrial CEOs gave about their experience with 
the sampled organizations, and on the opinion of the employees themselves. In this sense, we 
based the ranking of “more” and “less” successful organizations in confronting institutional 
complexity, using responses we got from some semi-structured questions. In particular, as 
concerned academics and CEOs, we focused the attention on three specific issues, 1) 
satisfaction about previous experiences with those organizations, 2) the likelihood to address 
those organizations for future projects, and 3) the extent to which they have maintained a 
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good relationship with the counterparty. Granted that a higher satisfaction, a greater 
likelihood, and a better quality of the relationship constituted the result of a higher 
organizational success in dealing with institutional complexity, to assess these issues we 
concentrated upon phrases like “I was really pleased about the result…”, “I really believe 
they [the organizations employees] did a good job”, “I reached so unexpected results…”, “I 
think their help will be useful in other occasions…”, “They gave me an hand in 
understanding how approaching the other part…”, and other similar sentences.  
 Regarding organizations informants, we also tried to get their opinion in terms of 
success reached in managing multiple institutional logics. Specifically, we focused on 
responses they gave to questions like “Do you perceive your organization being a point of 
reference in terms of technology transfer for academics and CEOs?”, and “To what degree 
do you perceive your stakeholders (i.e., academics and CEOs) being satisfied about the work 
you carried on?”. Then we cross-checked data obtained from these two sources in order to 
rank all the sampled organizations. The more the satisfaction of academic and industrial 
stakeholders, the higher the will to turn to those organizations for future projects and the 
quality of the relation undertaken with the other party, the more successful the organization 
was in dealing with different prescriptions. At the same time, the greater the employees’ 
opinion to be considered a reference point by academics and CEOs, the more the organization 
may be considered successful with the management of institutional complexity. In the end, we 
obtained three matched pairs, each composed by one “more” and one “less” successful 
organization in confronting multiple logics.   
   -------------------------------------------------------- 
    Insert Table 4 about here 
   -------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 DATA COLLECTION 
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 Data collection followed common recommendations for case-study analysis (e.g. Yin, 
2003; Eisenhardt, 1989), and combined archival documents, preliminary interviews, formal 
semi-structured interviews, and informal talks (see Table 5). 
   -------------------------------------------------------- 
    Insert Table 5 about here 
   -------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 We conducted the data collection process in three different phases. The first consisted 
of an exploratory stage (end of 2011), where we conducted interviews with some key 
informants of our organizations, in order to better understand the internal functioning, the 
different tasks held by employees and the real clash of different cultures and interests they 
experience in dealing with their stakeholders. This phase was fundamental for the 
construction of our interview protocol. We got in total 5 interviews, each of them lasting on 
average 45 minutes. All of them were taped in the original language (Italian) and transcribed. 
At the end of this process, we were completely sure that the setting was appropriate for 
exploring our theoretical interest.  
 The second phase (from January to February, 2012) was spent in collecting archival 
materials with the aim to develop a more in-depth understanding of technology transfer 
activities, the interaction between university and industry, and the change that occurred at the 
field level in terms of Italian and European legislation. At this stage, we collected research 
articles, texts of Italian and European laws, books, as well as documents produced by the 
organizations and electronic documentation.  
 During the third step (from January to August, 2012), we proceeded with the 
submission of the semi-structured interview protocol to our informants. Our sample of 
respondents included not only the employees of the organizations, but also academic 
researchers, executives and CEOs interacting with those organizations since they were the 
main stakeholders.  
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    Insert Table 6 about here 
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 Taking into account the different involvement of our respondents in technology 
transfer activities, we relied upon two separate interview protocols, one for academics and 
CEOs as people actively participating in the process but not employees of the selected 
organizations, and the other specifically designed for TTOs, UIC and UIs employees. Both 
the protocols were refined and adjusted over time according to new emerging aspects and to 
account for data saturation. Finally, we gathered 48 one-to-one interviews. With the exception 
of two skype interviews, interviews took place in informants’ offices and lasted between 30 
and 65 minutes. They were organized around a number of main areas. As concerns the 
protocol for the organizations, we got the following sections: organizational history, 
organizational structure, organizational strategy, performance, stakeholders and perception of 
logics (see Appendix A). In contrast, the protocol submitted to academics and CEOs was 
organized around the following domains: job characteristics, previous collaboration, 
experiences with the sampled organizations, and incentives (see Appendix B).         
  DATA ANALYSIS  
 We coded interviews and documents inductively, with the aim to find significant 
relationships between data, emerging themes, and existing literature. As Maxwell (1996) said, 
“the goal of coding is not to produce counts of things but to fracture the data and rearrange it 
into categories that facilitate comparison between things in the same category and between 
categories”. Data analysis consisted of several stages. 
 During the first stage, we wanted to better characterize our empirical setting in terms 
of the logics it included. We coded questions and archival material we got in order to better 
characterize the main points of friction between logics following some macro issues that, 
according to previous literature, deserved attention. We coded the passages where informants 
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emphasized the difference between academic and industrial world following the macro issues 
that, according to previous literature, deserved attention (Merton & Storer, 1973), such as 
goals, organization of work, identity, and mindset. In particular, we organized and 
summarized the coding of these data around main themes drawn from Thornton, Ocasio and 
Lounsbury (2012) that seemed recurrent in the discussion with our informants and the most 
important in specifying the differences between the two fields. This corroborated the idea that 
organizations dealing with technology transfer activities are really embedded in multiple 
prescriptions. In Table 7 we report the specification of these results.     
   -------------------------------------------------------- 
    Insert Table 7 about here 
   -------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 During the second step, we coded data with the aim to identify the organizational 
strategies deployed by the different typologies of organizations. The analysis began with an 
open coding process where we tried to abstract from the context and construct general 
meanings. Following Corley and Gioia (2004), we used in-vivo (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; 
Strauss & Corbin, 1998) or first order (Van Maanen, 1979) codes, that is lexicon used by the 
respondents, or an evocative phase when in-vivo code was unusable. This open coding was 
over time refined, since we read and reread the transcripts, creating new, more precise, codes 
and adjusting the existing ones. Through a comparative analysis of the text, the objective of 
this initial phase was to give the same code to an event, act or happening which shares 
common characteristics. We started to code each mention with respect to how the 
organization organizes itself internally and how interacts with the external environment. So, 
sentences like “different background and previous experiences” (I1), “hybrid competences” 
(U1), “people with PhD…an important resource” (T1), and “having specific experiences 
help to bridge the two contexts” (T2) all called to mind the broader idea that previous 
experience make the difference in mediating between academia and industry. 
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 Then, we began to search for relationships among the existing codes, in order to group 
concepts under a more abstract higher order themes and construct overarching dimensions. 
All the previous sentences were grouped, for example, under the theoretical category 
“employing boundary spanners”. The aim at this stage was to reduce the number of units and 
identify theoretical categories relevant to our analysis. The overall process was an analytic 
procedure through which we tried to let emerge theoretical relationships until interviews 
failed to reveal new relationships. In sum, we proceeded from “organizational categories” 
(Maxwell, 1998), which represent the broad subjects around which we organize our 
interviews, to substantive categories, that constitute the first, descriptive segmentation of data, 
and, finally, to theoretical categories, which have been used to develop a more general and 
abstract framework for outlining conclusions.    
 We used matrices to organize data (Miles & Huberman, 1994), in order to facilitate the 
analysis during the identification of patterns and minimize the likelihood of making a mistake 
in translating information. Moreover, throughout the analysis we triangulated interviews with 
archival documents, so as to avoid possible bias during data analysis and to ensure a deeper 
understanding and reliability of results (Maxwell, 1996). Finally, to enhance coding 
reliability, we asked an external researcher, fluent in our informants’ native language, to 
conduct a review of the process we followed to code data and of the products we obtained in 
terms of theoretical categories. This was useful for understanding if we overlooked something 
or did mistakes in separate themes conceptually. This researcher, in going through interview 
protocols, documents, interviews and coding schemes, provided important help in resolving 
conceptual discrepancies and ambiguities and in assessing whether our conclusions were 
plausible (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; see also, Corley & Gioia, 2004). The final data structure is 
presented in Table 8.  
   -------------------------------------------------------- 
    Insert Table 8 about here 
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4. FINDINGS 
 The most important premise to our findings concerns the typology of activities that the 
sampled organizations are coping with. Technology transfer is an extremely complex activity, 
subject to conditions of extreme uncertainty. In general, the more complex a task is, the more 
its outcome depends on the effectiveness and efficiency with which it is handled. A good 
technology, just because it has an intangible, tacit, uncertain and unique nature, is not 
sufficient to guarantee the success of the transfer process. The overall process hinges highly 
upon the competences held by the organization and the strategies it uses for mediating 
between the two parties. For all these reasons, the strategies deployed by those organization in 
confronting institutional complexity are really important for understanding, not only, the final 
results in terms of technology transfer, but also, the success they achieve in mediating the 
different interests.   
 The results below focus on the strategies that came out from our coding (see Table 8), 
as those strategies that have a positive impact on the results that organizations achieved in 
dealing with multi-logics pressures. We show below which they are and which are the 
mechanisms of their functioning within the organizations.  
 EMPLOYING BOUNDARY SPANNERS 
 A common characteristic of the more successful organizations of our sample, was the 
employment of personnel with the specific aim of enhancing the quality of communication 
between parties. Specifically, people maintaining relationships with both the communities – 
academics and industrial managers –, or playing a key role in decision-making processes, 
often had a significant experience within the academia, in terms of research projects, and a 
previous industrial experience. Some of them even had a PhD and were hence able to act as 
“boundary spanners” (Aldrich & Herker, 1977; Tushman & Scanlan, 1981; Fennel & 
93 
 
Alexander, 1987) between the university and business worlds.  
 For instance, in EPSILON, the manager of the most important project had 15-years-
old experience in a multinational company for 15 years after his graduation, and then decided 
to spend two years at New York University and at Stanford University as a senior research 
fellow and teaching assistant. After that, he came back to the industrial world in a 
multinational company. This combination of experience, education, and specific competences 
made him particularly able to manage the relationship between academics and CEOs and to 
make the communication more comprehensible between the two parties. Also the operations 
manager had 1.5-years experience within academia before joining EPSILON. A statement 
from him shows how this hybrid experience is considered valuable for the work they daily do: 
 “The work we do is very tricky, not only for the issues we deal with, but also for the 
 kind of relationships we have. If you fail to communicate with our stakeholders 
 [academic researchers and CEOs], it is over. The lack to have people with experience 
 in both contexts [university and business] lies just in trying to avoid this error” (U2). 
 In ALFA, people involved in keeping relations with academics and industrial 
managers had a science PhD and industrial experience. Having advanced technical skills, for 
example, allows them to evaluate the potential of a specific technology and its economic 
value in the right way. The application of methods for assessing the intellectual property, the 
protection of invention innovativeness as a response to possible objections, the identification 
of alternative application of a particular technology, are all examples of competences that 
require a deep understanding and knowledge of the overall process and a previous research 
experience. But, the same person has also to cope with the industrial partner and with its 
purpose to carry on technology development and the commercialization of products arising 
from that technology. For this reason an industrial experience is also important. The idea was 
to enhance internal skills, both for interacting with academics in the phase of intellectual 
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property protection and for better connecting the two sides in the following stage of research 
exploitation.  
 The role that boundary spanners had in managing logics compatibility is fundamental 
in two main aspects. First, they acted as a bridge between the two worlds, trying to emphasize 
the potential value that demands and objectives of each of them might have for the other side. 
In this sense, they operated as facilitators in combining the more akin aspects, in order to find 
the best pattern for both the parties. But, they also had an important impact on minimizing 
incomprehension and frictions between academic researchers and CEOs. For example, in 
EPSILON, the manager with the hybrid background played a key role when communication 
between industrial partner interested in the project and the academic researcher supervising it 
was required. In particular, he tried to smooth all the formal, but not substantial, difficulties, 
softening the point of view of each partner and broadening their understanding of the other 
side’s interests. He also tried to let parties think in terms of complementary instead of 
antithetical positions. The manager told us: 
 “My role, here in EPSILON, is both to act as “shepherd” for researchers not 
 accustomed to deal with concepts such as “budget”, “operating cost”, and to 
 guarantee that things have a deeper value than for a single enterprise (…). I always 
 try to lead academics straight to the point, with a problem-solving approach, and 
 CEOs to think in a more open way, however highlighting the benefit that each of them 
 may obtain from our activities” (U3) 
 In practical terms, this means to distract academics’ attention from more general 
behaviors, such as keeping things vague, and to focus CEOs’ attention on the importance that 
research developments might have on their company performance, besides the more obvious 
commercial applications achievable in a short time.         
 For the same reason, in GAMMA, the general manager, who had a valuable 
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experience both in public and private organizations, followed the rule of behaving as a “third 
part” (I2), which meant that the same treatment had to be ensured to each part. And the same 
treatment is considered with respect to the competences needed to evaluate each specific 
situation. He told us: 
 “If you have never had a direct taste of the mindset that each part has, you 
 cannot be really able to deal with them properly” (I2).   
A colleague said: 
 “His job is just that to assure an actual mediation between the two communities (....). 
 He tries to get this by talking a lot with people and meeting them several times. It is 
 often hard, but he seeks to leverage his hybrid skills to do that" (I3) 
 Indeed, whereas past experience in public institutions tend to endow people with 
bureaucratic procedures typical of these authority, previous experience in the private sector 
makes them conscious about needs and decision-making criteria that characterize business 
processes.  
 As regards the organizations defined as less successful, we noted a lack of attention to 
the issue of boundary spanners. For example, none of the employees had a PhD or a 
significant period spent within the academia after his/her graduation. Summarized as a 
proposition: 
 Proposition 1: As regards organizations confronting highly uncertain activities with 
 a high cognitive content, the likelihood to achieve a higher success in dealing with 
 institutional complexity, is greater for those employing boundary spanner people in 
 key roles envisaging a mediation between different institutional fields 
 MIRRORING THE DIFFERENT INSTITUTIONAL DEMANDS 
 We observed that the more successful organizations had a more defined division of 
work, with clear-cut tasks for each area or group. For instance, in ALFA, the general manager 
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said:  
 “It's very simple. (…) the unit is divided into two main offices: protection and 
 exploitation. Each office has a responsible and a team of people working with him/her. 
 We have people with a hard scientific background (i.e., biology, chemistry), useful for 
 evaluating patent applications, and people with a legal background, needed during the 
 contractual phase. Our real strength is to put together all these skills” (T3)     
In addition to set clear reference points for academics and CEOs, these organizations chose 
the tasks of each employee so to maximize the degree of success of the relationship 
undertaken with parties. This aspect meant that both sides were more likely to be pleased with 
the work done by the organization and, therefore, to have more persistence in going ahead 
with the relation with the other party. An industrial manager explained the issue: 
 “(…) having defined reference point is important for us in order to minimize 
 response time and misunderstanding. If you have a specific problem and you know 
 that you can rely on someone skilled on that, the reliability of the entire process 
 increase and you are more incentivized to find a shared [with academic researchers] 
 solution. In ALFA, I  found that” (C2).       
 A greater specialization of the process connecting academics and industrial managers 
increased the quality of the service provided by the organization. So, while in ALFA, T4 dealt 
only with patents and requests on this issue, in BETA, T5 dealt with patents, start-up and 
other projects and activities. This higher specialization facilitated a feeling of trust and 
collaboration by academics and CEOs, therefore reducing the transaction costs related to the 
negotiation and increasing the likelihood of managing successfully the relationship. Also in 
GAMMA and EPSILON, the organizational structure was well defined, in terms of 
subdivision of tasks and communication flow. In particular, in EPSILON, we found a manger 
for each project and, in each project, each person had particular assignments to accomplish, 
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according to his/her community of reference. This allowed for a more defined characterization 
of roles and for a higher specialization of tasks.  
 Moreover, this greater specialization played several roles in managing logics 
compatibility. It granted to academics and CEOs the chance to deal with people having 
specific competences on issues of interest. It could seem, at a first glance, a weakness, but 
then we realized that this characteristic was very appreciated by both parties. Indeed, the 
division of work ensured to face problems in a deeper way (“the qualification of those people 
on specific issues, make me confident of the suggestions they give” (C3 about EPSILON)), to 
understand requirements and demands of both sides and deal better with them (“they make me 
feel pretty understood (…). I perceived that they have enough familiarity with the matter” 
(C4 about GAMMA)), and to recognize possible points of frictions and smooth them (“(…) 
the experience they accumulate on specific issues is important for weakening the divergences 
and strengthening the possible common interests” (C5 about ALFA)). All this was confirmed 
by a CEO who had the opportunity to interact with ZETA and said that in most cases the 
failure of relationships, even before trying to reach an agreement, was due to employee’s lack 
of a deep comprehension.  
 However, we wanted to make sure that this greater specialization did not undermine 
the communication between parties and groups, otherwise it would have meant a lower 
process effectiveness, where each person knew only a little part of the story. Therefore, we 
asked our organizational informants about frequency and contents of their meetings. In all the 
organizations, people met at least 2-3 times per week, in order to update the others about the 
new activities assumed. Moreover, whereas new information about relationships already 
undertaken could be of interest for other colleagues, they were promptly shared with them. A 
project manager of EPSILON said:  
 “if I receive an update or a request from a researcher or an enterprise I immediately 
98 
 
 inform the other colleagues interested in this information, in order to make the process 
 faster and more effective” (U4) 
This way of behaving was common to all the organizations we analyzed and did not represent 
a distinction between more and less successful organizations. The main idea was that if an 
activity has a high cognitive content, then, the more the information shared, the greater the 
likelihood to make the overall process more effective.  
 Specifically, we found that the more successful organizations mirror their 
environment, in the sense that they envisaged specific roles for different people, according to 
the logic they have to cope with. In sum, they strategically provided different figures of 
reference for academics and CEOs, with a clear-cut division of work, and some key boundary 
spanners people, bridging among them and final stakeholders. Summarized as a proposition:  
 Proposition 2: As regards organizations confronting highly uncertain activities with 
 a high cognitive content, communicative flow being equal, the likelihood to obtain a 
 higher success in dealing with multi-logics pressures, is greater for those mirroring the 
 demands they cope with, in terms of assignment of tasks and work division 
 Proposition 3: As regards organizations confronting highly uncertain activities with 
 a high cognitive content, the likelihood to obtain a higher success in dealing with 
 multi-logics pressures, is greater for those mixing some key boundary spanner figures 
 with some specialized roles    
 BUFFERING MULTIPLE LOGICS, INSTEAD OF JUST LINKING THEM  
 ALFA and GAMMA provided a significant illustration about the “buffering” strategy. 
They clearly make efforts to identify relationships and exploit synergy between the different 
stakeholders’ points of view. Their strategy was characterized by the attempt to retain the 
plurality coming from different logics, while minimizing conflict and maximizing their 
synergy. We observed a process where diverse logics were managed following a 
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prioritization, based on the different phases of the technology transfer process. As a manager 
in ALFA said 
 “at the beginning, when the academic researcher and the firm meet each other for the 
 first time, we always have to go in depth in understanding their points of view and 
 what they expect. Only starting from here, we can leverage, during the different 
 phases, their skills and competences for achieving the best we can from their 
 collaboration” (T1) 
In ALFA, they really believed that being dynamic and uncovering opportunities for parties is 
a good strategy to achieve better results for collaboration and higher satisfaction. These 
interesting opportunities might be European funding announcements, regional funds for 
collaborative research, etc., and are really linked to the different stages of the process. If at the 
beginning sources of funds are probably more appreciated, later high skilled people are more 
needed. In doing so, ALFA had to be deeply involved in each relationship between academic 
researcher and industry, acting as a buffer whenever an appreciation of the research is 
required, or an in-depth analysis of industrial application is needed by the researcher. An 
employee said that “each party always tries to undervalue what the other does or proposes” 
(T6), and for this reason “we always have to fight against this idea, by providing clear and 
meaningful evidences” (T6). Academic researcher, for example, usually do not think about 
the possible industrial applications of their research, since patenting is not in their priority. So 
the risk of compromising research results for commercial application is high. But, if the 
research is monitored throughout the process of collaboration, as in ALFA is, then, “you can 
kill two birds with one stone and achieve results that would otherwise be impossible” (T6). 
This means that the organization has to be ceaselessly in contact with both parties, and, in 
each phase, understand what is worth stressing and what not. An employee in ALFA said:  
 “When we license a patent, we have always to give a kind of priority to the different 
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 interests at stake. This doesn’t mean neglecting the other part. It is like trying to find 
 the best solution starting from different needs: while you have to preserve their 
 peculiarities, you also have to look for the best result. For doing that we must 
 prioritize activities, objectives, interests, and so on, according to the different stages. 
 (…) this always requires the ability to let the other part feel that what you are doing 
 is important also for itself” (T3)   
 So, the important aspect, connected to the behavior of being always proactive and 
dynamic, is that the more successful organizations managed the tension between the two 
logics by sequentially attending to the most pressing issue at hand. In particular, ALFA 
sought to achieve what each part would not reach alone, through the prioritization of certain 
goals in some phases and other goals in other phases. This required a high capability of 
communication and the awareness that being present in all the phases of the process was 
fundamental. This behavior allowed to damp down on discussions, which had a negative 
impact on the relationship, and to ensure the achievement of a good agreement. For example, 
during patents licensing, ALFA made efforts in emphasizing the value that each part might 
obtain by its interaction with the other side, in terms of visibility, subsequent research 
improvements and money for the academic researcher, and in terms of innovation, 
relationship with university and low prices for enterprises. An employee in ALFA clearly 
stated that “it would be impossible for each part to achieve this surplus value, if alone” (T2). 
But, for reaching stakeholders’ satisfaction and good results in terms of technology transfer, 
ALFA had to prioritize issues and problems according to the immediate situation and let 
parties feel a major complicity, so maximizing the overall synergy. In doing so, parties 
became less obstinate on their positions and they ultimately got some benefits from their 
relation.   
 Also in EPSILON our informants clearly showed that the process through which 
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academics and CEOs interacted is based on the awareness that different stages were present 
and each of them had to pay more attention on some aspects instead of others. The general 
manager said: 
 “The bigger problem in this kind of collaboration is about communication. If you let 
 parties communicate alone, then, after a while, each of them will come back home 
 more uncertain and discouraged than at the beginning. So the bigger efforts is just in 
 acting  as mediator between them, in order to minimize incomprehension and let them 
 understand that together could reach much more than alone” (U5) 
For example, they usually work for creating group of young researchers skilled in the issue of 
reference, in order to help academics and the industrial CEOs involved in the collaboration to 
deepen important aspects connected to the passage from basic to applied result. Also in 
GAMMA, the general manager said 
 “When an academic and an industrial manager meet, it’s always a problem of point of 
 view. We have to bridge their positions, without make a dent in their diversity. The 
 effort is in leveraging one or another competence or point of view, according to the 
 situation, in order to minimize conflict” (I2)    
For example, at the beginning they pushed academic researchers to work hard with the other 
party on the industrial development of research results. This might seem a facilitation for the 
industrial part only, in terms of competitive advantage over competitors. But, EPSILON 
always highlighted that this behavior would advantage academics too, especially in terms of 
publications, needed for career advancement. In fact, a well implemented innovation at the 
industrial level led academics to more appealing publications for their community of 
reference considering that, besides the theoretical result, they may show its applicability.  
In this sense those organizations worked as a “buffer” between the two logics: keeping alive 
diversity, but leveraging the strengths that each part can bring in and being instigator of 
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different initiatives. This is a strategy for promoting the collaboration and enhancing the value 
of the final outcome. Paying attention to the differences that each phase of the process 
inevitably includes and trying to make up for the failure dangers that each of them embeds, is 
the key role of an organization that act as a “buffer” between two different fields.  
 Also in GAMMA they clearly work for buffering the different positions, by acting as 
promoter of new, good opportunities for both the parties (i.e., events participation, funding for 
research development, searching of capitalists, etc…), and always mediating between them, 
without letting them communicating alone. This obviously implies a very good knowledge of 
the process and a deep competence, in order to stress the different skills according to the 
phase of the process and, at the same time, do not vex the other part.  
 We perceived that this “buffering” strategy made stakeholders more pleased about the 
overall result, with better feedback in terms of quality of the relationship and a stronger belief 
to undertake other collaborations in the future. In this sense, we can say that this represents a 
way to stay exactly in the middle between the two parties, effectively promoting their 
collaboration, with the aim to reduce conflict and enhance satisfaction, and also to directly 
increase the organization reputation. An academic explicitly said: 
 “Every time we have to discuss about some issues, even not so important, EPSILON is 
 always present. Even when you're angry about something and the intention would be 
 that of messing up, at the end you come home with something good that you did  not 
 expect. This wouldn’t be possible if we [academics and industrial part] were let 
 alone” (A1) 
 On the contrary, the behavior observed in the less successful organizations was much 
more detached and the effort was just in trying to link the two logics, letting them 
communicate by themselves. Their attempt was to put logics together, but without considering 
what might be done in addition to really obtain the best results possible. They did not pay so 
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much attention to the different phases of the relational process and to what each of them 
needed most. An employee in BETA said: 
 “There are cases in which the achievement of an agreement seems impossible. In such 
 situations our role become too challenging and we can only let them speak (…) but 
 we cannot avoid conflict” (T7)   
They were really convinced that the most important value of a collaboration was the direct 
communication between parties, where they acted as a link. But this strategy was not so much 
appreciated by a lot of stakeholders, both academics and industrial, who stated “if the 
relationship is perceived in that way, perhaps their support would not be much required. I 
would expect something more” (A2). A manager in DELTA told us: 
 “We really believe on face-to-face communication between parties: this allows them 
 to confront directly on the key issues, even though it often results in strong 
 misunderstanding, difficult for us to manage” (I1)      
 Speaking, in terms of plurality and synergy, these organizations wish to preserve a 
high degree of the former, by favoring the aggregation of logics (i.e., safeguarding the 
different interests during the collaboration), but, practically, they achieve a lower degree of 
synergy between them, recurring to a more detached approach.       
 Proposition 4: As regards organizations confronting highly uncertain activities with 
 a high cognitive content, the likelihood of success in responding to institutional 
 complexity is greater for those buffering multiple logics instead of those  linking them 
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 Institutional pluralism and complexity have been recognized by institutional scholars 
to be a standard condition of organizational life in an increasing number of fields (Pache & 
Santos, 2012; Greenwood et al., 2011). Whereas most of the recent works using an 
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institutional logics approach have focused on particular responses to institutional complexity, 
none of them has addressed the problem of understanding which response may be considered 
more successful in dealing with that phenomenon. Our study brings new insights on this issue, 
trying to connect organizational dynamics, with strategic actions and the degree of success 
achieved in managing complexity. This finding allows us to advance the current debate and 
contribute to institutional theory by showing that the organizations do not conform passively 
to the demands coming from the environment, but purposively react to them, enough to get to 
respond differently to the same problem. In particular, we believe that our findings contribute 
to existing literature in multiple ways. 
 INTRA-ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS  
 Following an organizational point of view, we think that our analysis gave us the 
possibility to better understand the phenomenon of multiple logics coexistence and the actions 
that organizations deploy to deal with it. The condition of institutional complexity confronted 
by organizations is neither straightforward nor simple. Institutional theory, which predicted 
passive organizational compliance to institutional demands, has been often criticized for its 
lack of an explicit and coherent theory of action (Pache & Santos, 2010; DiMaggio & Powell, 
1991). Instead, our results suggest that organizational decisions and actions have a powerful 
effect on how organizations respond to the different interests and objectives coming from 
diverse stakeholders. This is a noteworthy point, if we consider that existing literature has 
often focused on the environmental, rather than internal, determinants of how organizations 
respond to institutional mandates (Greenwood et al., 2011; Pache & Santos, 2010). Our study 
suggest that to really appreciate the relationship between institutional complexity and 
organizational reaction, it is critical to delve into the organization and explore how actors 
perceive and react to those forces.  
 Our analysis of organizational dynamics drove us to what we consider the most 
105 
 
important contribution of the study. In particular, we found that not all the organizations 
responded in the same way to the same problem. Indeed, institutional complexity was 
perceived differently by organizations and that different strategies were considered significant 
to respond to it. Thus, an organization’s response to a given institutional circumstance is not 
necessarily constant: it may change dramatically with respect to the organization, even if the 
situation itself is the same. In this sense, the analysis of organizational dynamics allowed us, 
on one hand, to dispel the myth of conformity and isomorphism in institutional theory 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) and, on the other hand, to give insights about the diverse 
approach that organizations use in confronting institutional complexity. Our findings suggest 
that organizations might lessen the “conflict” experienced with institutional complexity by 
developing some particular strategies that allow to face that condition in a more successful 
way, compared to other organizations. Having boundary spanners, mirroring institutional 
demands, and acting as a buffer between the two logics, instead of just linking them, are the 
strategic actions that made a difference in the way in which organizations fared when faced 
with different institutional pressures.  
 Previous literature has explored the influence of specific organizational characteristics 
on institutional complexity including structure, field position, governance, ownership and 
identity (Greenwood et al., 2011; Pache & Santos, 2010), but we did not have an 
understanding of how organizational dynamics may make such complexity more or less acute 
(Greenwood et al., 2011). These organizational outcomes appear to reflect differences in the 
organization’s ability to perceive the points of contrast, work on them and leverage the 
internal competences to find the most appropriate response. We find that particular strategies 
can enable organizations to please institutional referents and thus obtain their support. Thus, 
going in depth in exploring organizational dynamics and competing ideas, our paper provides 
foundational work to understand in a systematic way the impact of organizations’ strategies 
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on this common phenomenon of conflicting institutional demands. Moreover, it allowed to 
know that not all the organizational responses to institutional pressures are the same, rather 
they may be different and associated to a higher or lower degree of stakeholders satisfaction.  
 MICRO-DYNAMICS OF INSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
 For almost two decades, scholars have stressed the need to make the micro-
foundations of institutional theory more explicit (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Zucker, 1991), 
but there has been limited progress in this effort (Powell & Colyvas, 2008). The relationship 
between micro events in which participants act in situated and patterned ways (Goffman, 
1959) and macro-level equilibrium has been recognized to be an important one (Dacin et al., 
2010). In particular, in this paper, we help to bring some insights about the micro-level 
dynamics of institutional theory. Indeed, our study shows that the way organizational actors 
experience different institutional logics is not a direct reflection of how an institution appears 
at the macro level. Rather, institutional logics are refracted through individual experience and 
interaction. In other words, they are situated and interpreted at local levels.  
 Specifically, our findings highlight that actors’ decisions and actions deeply affect the 
way in which complexity is perceived, experienced and managed. As an informant said, “we 
[the employees] do not have the same perception of things (…). It is just interacting with each 
other that we gain a more uniform idea and a clearer direction” (U9). The decision to engage 
in actions, all directed to manage institutional complexity, such as employing particular 
figures and investing in specific competences, is an obvious example of how micro-dynamics 
within the organization and institutions at an higher level are connected. It was just the 
attention we paid to both less powerful members of organizations and managers, that enabled 
us to grab the importance of such micro-dynamics for the phenomenon of institutional 
complexity, that institutional literature has recognized to be present both at the organizational 
and at the field level.     
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 We learned from our data that members of organizations engage in daily practices, 
deal with different prescriptions and demands, discover puzzles or anomalies, and develop 
answers to institutional complexity. We did not have data to explore in depth the decision-
making process within organizations, but our findings clearly show that the different 
strategies that organizations deploy to confront multi-logics pressures are the result of actors’ 
interaction, perceptions, choices, decisions and actions. In sum, we believe that our findings 
disclose that the management of institutional complexity is rooted in micro events. We 
therefore think that we have been able to respond to the call for institutional researchers to 
analyze, in a more systematic way, the relationship between organizational actions and field-
level logics (Greenwood et al., 2011) and, in a sense, to return to the “coalface” of 
institutional theory in order to shed light on “the link between institutions and the person” 
(Barley, 2008; Powell & Colyvas, 2008). 
 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 The most important issue connected to case study research is the degree to which 
findings are generalizable to other contexts and to a broader sample. However, the use of a 
comparative, multiple case study of six organizations represented a stronger point in this 
sense. Although technology transfer is a particular activity, characterized by high uncertainty 
and complexity, we believe that our findings have applicability beyond this context, that we 
consider only a case among a lot of others. In fact, we sampled our organizations just looking 
at if they were or not involved in confronting a situation of institutional complexity and not at 
the content of the logics they had to deal with. For this reason, our findings may apply more 
broadly to other organizations subject to institutional complexity, and can be considered a 
result of a study that goes beyond the academic and market logics we took into account.  It 
would be interesting to test and refine the results gained here in other contexts to more fully 
establish their validity and generalizability.  
108 
 
 As regards future research, it would be interesting to analyze the decision-making 
process that allow an organization to successfully confront institutional complexity. We 
provided insights about the final strategies that made the difference in dealing with such 
situation, but we still lack a knowledge of the whole process that lead an organization to 
strategically react in a way instead of another. In this sense, it might be helpful to go more in 
depth in exploring the internal organizational conditions and connect them with the 
environment of reference (Greenwood et al., 2011). An example could be that of studying 
how organizational leaders’ competences, skills, and capabilities affect the organization’s 
ability to deploy some particular strategies and to respond more or less successfully to 
institutional complexity. This is suggestive of a more bottoms-up approach to organizational 
change in situations of institutional complexity. 
 Moreover, with respect to the institutional stream of research focused on change, it 
might be interesting to see institutional complexity as a process in which different phases are 
present, each of them with specific needs. Thus, for example, the technology transfer process, 
characterized by the diverging interests of university and industry, represents a dynamic 
process in which the equilibrium between logics change according to the different stages. The 
beginning and the end are not equal in terms of skills and abilities required. So, it would be 
interesting to better know under what circumstances, connected to the diverse phases, the 
perception and experience of institutional complexity change and, subsequently, how this 
differences affect the final response.   
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1.  
Year  Phase Event 
  
The imitative openness 
 
1989   The State established the basic principle of self-regulation, increasing universities’ administrative 
autonomy.  
Right and duties of academic scientists’ relating to patents still governed by pre-republic “law on 
invention”, which granted IPRs on employees’ invention to employer.  
 
  A more conscious 
working-out 
 
1993 - 1996  
  
Further elaborations of the first reform introduced additional autonomy for university. 
 
In 1993, greater freedom in the use of funds coming from the Ministry 
In 1996 greater autonomy with respect to internal regulations (e.g., statutes) 
 
1997    Introduction of the notion of “spin-off” 
  The 
awareness 
  
2001   
 
The State, moving in the opposite direction with respect to the European mainstream, introduced 
the so-called “academic privilege”, that secured IPRs on scientists’ inventions to the academic 
scientists themselves.   
 
2004   The State returned back in stating that IPRs on public employees’ inventions, that come from 
research financed at least by private sector or public organizations different from inventors’ ones, 
lie with the public employer instead of the employees.  
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Table 2. Typologies of organizations involved in TT between academia and industry 
 
                              
                                  Field of origin  
      
                Positioning 
One  Multiple  
Internal Technology Transfer Offices Joint Research Labs 
External University Incubators University-Industry Consortia  
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Table 3. Description of cases 
 
Cases 
TTOs UIs UIC 
ALFA 
 
BETA 
 
GAMMA 
 
DELTA 
 
EPSILON 
 
ZETA 
 
Founding year 2004 2001 2004 2000 2004 1997 
Founding origins University with 
an extended 
mission 
University with 
an extended 
mission 
University and 
Bank 
Foundation4 
University, 
University 
Foundation and 
Bank Foundation 
University and 
Firms 
Association 
University, 
Chambers of 
Commerce, 
Local 
Governments and 
Bank Foundation 
Positioning Within the 
university 
Within the 
university 
Independent Independent Independent Independent 
 
Staff 6 4 
 
3 2 10  9  
Activity Exploiting 
research results in 
various forms 
Exploiting 
research results in 
various forms 
Facilitating spin-
offs creation and 
growth  
Facilitating spin-
offs creation and 
growth 
Strengthening 
university-
industry 
collaboration on 
specific projects 
Strengthening 
university-
industry 
collaboration on 
specific projects 
  
 
                                                             
4 These Foundations are private, non-profit, autonomous organizations established in the early nineties in Italy, as a result of the law 218/90 
(Amato law) which led to the privatization of the Savings banks and of the Monte banking group.  
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Table 4. More and less successful organizations in dealing with institutional complexity 
 
 
TTOs UIs UBC 
More successful ALFA GAMMA EPSILON 
Less successful BETA DELTA ZETA 
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Table 5. Typology of data and their use 
Sources Typology of data Data use 
Interviews 
511 pages double-spaced 
Preliminary interviews (5) with top managers to 
investigate organizations history and their internal 
functioning  
 
Familiarize with the organizational contexts 
 
Identify informants for the following focused 
interviews 
 
Semi-structured interviews (5) with academic executive 
 
Go in depth in exploring changes within the academic 
context, to better understand the sudden opening up to 
technology transfer and collaboration with industrial 
world 
  
Semi-structured interviews (21) with informants within 
the organizations  
 
Go in depth in exploring work processes and 
organizational characteristics 
 
Collect perceptions about the degree of success reached 
by the organizations in dealing with multiple logics 
 
Semi-structured interviews (22) with academic 
researchers and industrial manager to understand, on one 
hand, their objectives and interests and, on the other hand 
their overall opinion about the organizations involved in 
technology transfer 
 
Identify the characteristics of the different institutional 
logics they belong to 
 
Gather opinions and perceptions about the degree of 
success that the organizations achieved in confronting 
institutional complexity 
  
Archival materials 
Organization-related documents about: organization 
chart, general data on projects, activities carried on, 
mission     
 
Triangulate data and support information emerging 
from interviews 
E-mails exchange with top managers of the organizations 
 
Refine information collected with interviews, have 
further details and triangulate data 
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Table 6. Descriptions of interviews 
 
 
Interviewees Number 
Male 5 + 41 
Female 7 
  
Preliminary interviews 5 
  
Focused interviews 48 
Academic researchers 11 
Academic executive 5 
CEOs 11 
  
TTOs 8 
UIs 3 
UBC 10 
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Table 7. Characteristics of academic logic and market logic 
 
 
Characteristics 
 
 
Academic logic 
 
Market logic 
“Publications, open science and basic 
research for peer recognition” 
 
“Secrecy and innovation for financial returns 
and competitive advantage” 
Goal 
 
Basic research for publications Innovate for competitive advantage and 
longer-term financial payoffs 
 
Source of legitimacy 
 
Personal expertise Market position of the firm 
Source of authority 
 
Faceless Top management 
Source of identity 
 
Personal reputation Firm reputation 
Basis of attention 
 
Status in academia Status in hierarchy 
Basis of strategy 
 
Increase personal reputation Increase profits 
Build competitive position 
 
 
 
 
 
 
116 
 
Table 8. Data supporting the emergence of organizational characteristics  
 
Theoretical categories 
 
Representative quotations 
Employing boundary spanners 
 
“We really take advantage of previous experience that some of us had in contexts different respect to this one (…) 
We think that “hybrid” competences allow a more effective mediation” (UBC: Falavigna) 
 
“I think that my previous experience in the private sector represents an important asset for going straight to the 
point. The  process of mediation between the two parties seems to be less difficult and complex” (UI: Fabris) 
 
“People with PhD represent for us an important resource: their technical background enables them to better grasp 
specific issues and connect the different pieces of the problem” (TTO: Conti) 
 
“Having people with different background and previous experiences would be important for improving our ability 
in bridging different positions” (UI: Bugamelli) 
 
Mirroring institutional demands 
 
“I perceive my organization being very clear about the division of tasks. This enhance a lot our timeliness and 
accuracy in responding to requests and problems” (TTO: Ruggeri) 
 
“In this organization we don’t have a clear-cut division of assignments. Yes, I’m the reference person for spin-
offs, but, if I happen to come across something else, I do it” (TTO: Pavan) 
 
“From the very beginning, we communicate to our stakeholders the persons to whom they have to make reference 
for each specific problem. So Elena deals with patents, Andrea with licenses, Francesca with all contracts, about 
legal aspects, (…)” (TTO: Conti) 
  
“(…) having defined reference point is important for us, in order to minimize response  time and 
misunderstanding. If you have a specific problem and you know that you can rely on someone skilled on that, the 
reliability of the entire process increase and you are more incentivized to find a shared [with academic 
researchers] solution. In ALFA, I  found that” (CEO di bologna) 
 
“We should enhance our specialization, in order to improve more our competences and proceed with a more clear 
division of work among us” (UBC: Malaguti) 
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Buffering multiple logics “(…) it would be impossible for each part to achieve this surplus value, if alone” (TTO: Turchi) 
 
“When an academic and an industrial manager meet, it’s always a problem of point of view. We have to bridge 
their positions, without make a dent in their diversity. The effort is in leveraging one or another competence or 
point of view, according to the situation, in order to minimize conflict” (UI: Fabris) 
 
“Each side could not achieve alone the same it can obtain with the interaction with the other part” (UI: Fabris) 
 
“During the different phases of the process, we always tray to assure the achievement of their [those of academic 
researchers and firms] different objectives, while leveraging their specific skills and competences for achieving 
the best we can from their collaboration” (UBC: Vignocchi) 
 
“Each phase of the process has different priorities and we definitely have to take into account this point. It is not 
enough trying to satisfy parties, we should seek the best solution for them, recurring to their different abilities 
according to the situation” (UBC: Falavigna)     
 
“Leveraging abilities and minimize conflict are our key priorities. We reach the result by always acting as a 
“buffer” between the two positions…this requires a very active role during all the process” (TTO: Conti) 
  
Linking multiple logics “We always try to achieve parity between stakeholders’ interests. We work to reach a sort of compromise among 
their different objectives. But, often, we fail to reach an agreement because they stand firm on their own positions 
and we can’t avoid conflict” (UI: Bugamelli) 
 
“It is very difficult to minimize the distrust they have of the other part. We believe letting them confronting face to 
face about their position would allow a better comprehension, but often this exacerbate the situation (…), then the 
relationship become even more mistrustful” (TTO: Pavan)    
 
“We really believe on face-to-face communication between parties: this allows them to  confront directly on the 
key issues, even though it often results in strong  misunderstanding, that are difficult for us to manage” (UI: 
Paulina)  
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PAPER III: 
HOW EXTERNAL SUPPORT MAY MITIGATE THE BARRIERS  
TO UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY COLLABORATION 
 
 
 
Elisa VILLANI** 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Although university-industry collaboration has been analyzed following different 
perspectives and approaches, some aspects are still scant and unexplored. This article 
assesses, by recourse to an inductive, exploratory case study of Technology Transfer 
Offices (henceforth TTOs), how external support may affect university-industry 
collaboration and what characteristics, both of parties and intermediary unit, might 
facilitate the success of those relationship. We considered two of the most active TTOs 
in Italy, namely Politecnico di Torino and University of Bologna, resting upon different 
kinds of documents and 25 semi-structured interviews with academics, CEOs and TTOs 
employees. Tapping the subdivision identified by Von Dierdonck and Debackere 
(1988), different barriers to university-industry collaboration, pointed out by 
respondents, are proposed. Additionally, our findings revealed previously 
underexplored aspects about TTOs support to university-industry relationship. In 
particular, we argue that university-industry collaboration is more likely to succeed if 
parties resort to external support (such as that of TTOs), and if specific characteristics of 
both parties and TTOs subsist. A summarizing model is proposed.        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: University-industry collaboration; Technology Transfer Office; Technology 
transfer process; Case study.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 How does a university-industry collaboration take shape when parties hold different 
interests and objectives? And, how external support may mitigate these barriers? With the 
evolution of globalization of markets and industries, European research is faced with the 
implications of new issues, such as innovation and new technologies, that have deeply 
affected research landscape (Commission of the European Communities, 2007). In particular, 
with the emergence of a knowledge-based economy, innovation and competitiveness are 
increasingly affected by the output of public research and by the ability of university and 
business to work together, so that technology transfer activities can be truly effective. 
 In this rapidly changing scenery, the importance of establishing a strong scientific 
knowledge base has become a fundamental asset for internal and international competition. 
More specifically, the change occurred in the international panorama has meant that the 
emphasis for competitiveness was increasingly placed on intangibles assets, rather than 
physical ones.  
 Since, historically, “research institutions were perceived as a source of new ideas” 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2007), the will of the business world to use 
these public ideas as strategic resource for competitive advantage has increased more and 
more. While, on a worldwide scale, for many years, university and research centers in general 
are providing their valuable contribution to economic development through more intense and 
effective technology transfer activities, in Italy, the need for sharing knowledge between 
public institutions and private organizations has become increasingly evident recently, 
leading, in particular, to a significant change in the roles of both parties. Lately, growing 
attention has been given to this debate, with more concrete initiatives and actions, undertaken 
both spontaneously and under the pressure of legislative impulses. Changes occurred at 
institutional level have further stimulated and facilitated actions promoted individually by 
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universities (Bianchi & Piccaluga, 2012). While public institutions need to play a more active 
role in the exploitation of their research results, industry should be more present in orienting 
and refining specialized research activities.  
 In 2001, the law 383/2001, so-called “Tremonti bis”, represented an important turning 
point for Italian research landscape, setting new rules about the ownership of patent rights for 
inventions. It allowed academic scientists to own patents arising from their research, 
overturning the legislation in force since 1957 (i.e., D.P.R. 3/1957), which established that 
the ownership of intellectual property was in-chief at the university. In 2005, the legislative 
decree 30/2005 strengthened the position undertaken by the Government four years before, 
however recognizing at the university the right to participate in any revenue for commercial 
exploitation of the patents.  
 After these preliminary remarks, the first, important consideration to do, concerns the 
fact that university and industry have been historically considered as belonging to different 
institutionalized spheres, that hold separate streams of knowledge. Their differentiation has 
often been based on the distinction between basic and applied research (Merton & Storer, 
1973; Stokes, 1997; Murray & O’Mahony, 2007; Sauermann & Stephan, 2011). Merton and 
Storer (1973) highlighted that research and business world are linked to different norms and 
institutions, which represent different archetypes. In particular, while the research mission of 
academia is to carry on basic research, which results in fundamental insights, industrial world 
is focused on financial returns, that are connected to applied research and development 
(Sauermann & Stephan, 2011). All these differences constitute important barriers in 
managing those relationships, considering that each party may want to explore different 
aspects of a research project and that the results they are interested in may also diverge 
(Bruneel et al., 2010).    
 Nevertheless, the awareness of their interdependence is growing, both within 
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academia and industrial world. Thus, the importance of improving knowledge transfer 
between public research institutions and third parties has been recognized as a fundamental 
area for action. Many Italian universities have begun, in recent years, to set up dedicated 
Technology Transfer Offices, aimed at boosting and facilitating knowledge transfer, in order 
to promote competitiveness and contribute to the effectiveness of public research. But also 
other organizations involved in technology transfer activities, such as University-Business 
Incubators (UBIs) and Joint Research Labs (JRLs), are increasing more and more.  
 For all these reasons, the theme of public-private collaborations has merited 
considerable recent attention from scholars, and, within this broad issue, the ones between 
university and industry have caught management researchers’ interest. In particular, although 
it has been widely recognized that academic and industrial worlds are substantially different, 
few studies have attempted to better understand the real barriers the two fields meet in 
collaborating and, moreover, which kind of support could attenuate the difficulties coming 
from these barriers, fostering their cooperation (Brunnel et al., 2010). The present work tries 
to fill this lack.     
 Our empirical results highlight barriers that academia and firms find in their 
collaborations. More interestingly, we emphasize in which way university-business 
relationship could get over these barriers, and which might be the determinants of their final 
success. To answer these questions, we will use an inductive, exploratory analysis, that is a 
multiple-case study, of two Italian TTOs. This units are considered, as contexts where science 
and business logics encounter for various forms of relationships. We rely on 25 semi-
structured interviews with academic researchers, CEOs, and TTOs employees and on 
documents coming from different sources.  
 The paper is organized as follows: sections 2, 3 and 4 refer to previous literature to 
discuss the perceived differences between university and industry, the barriers to their 
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collaborations and the support they might receive by external units to overcome these 
difficulties; section 5 explains the methodology we use; section 6 shows the main results; 
section 7 discusses them, trying to shed light on open questions and future research, and 
concludes.    
 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 THE REPUBLIC OF SCIENCE AND THE KINGDOM OF INDUSTRY1 
 According to stereotypical view, industrial and academic worlds represents two 
distinct knowledge production regimes, designed to perform different types of research 
(Sauermann & Stephan, 2011; Gomes et al., 2005). “While universities are primarily driven 
to create new knowledge and to educate, private firms are focused on capturing valuable 
knowledge that can be leveraged for competitive advantage” (Brunnel et al., 2010). As 
Gomes et al. (2005) said, we are speaking about the republic of science and the kingdom of 
industry. 
 The tension between the two domains is mainly based on the final interests embedded 
in the dominant norm which characterize those different contexts. On one hand, the academic 
field is described at best by the logic that emphasizes the importance of research as public 
good and of its disclosure in form of publications (Merton & Storer, 1973; Dasgupta & 
David, 1994; Sauermann & Stephan, 2011). Moreover, knowledge resulting from academic 
research is typically associated to basic research with little commercial value. This set of 
norms and values, have contributed to the development of a particular incentive system that 
“encourages the production and sharing of research findings based on non-financial 
incentives such as peer recognition from the scientific community” (Sauermann & Stephan, 
2011; Merton & Storer, 1973; Stephan, 1996). Then, academic scientists are incentivized to 
                                                             
1
 The phrase is taken by Gomes et al., 2005  
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open up knowledge in order to obtain a certification of significance, represented by the 
publication per se (Gans et al., 2011).  
 On the other hand, business identity is depicted by rules and values that stress the 
relevance of commercial potential and financial returns. Taking into account these 
characteristics, business world is much more oriented to discourage research disclosure in 
order to rely upon secrecy and patenting of new knowledge (Sauermann & Stephan, 2011; 
Gans et al., 2011). So, industrial field is driven by a profit-making interest, which is in a 
sense maximized when an organization can exploit the competitive advantage derived from 
the development and capitalization of basic research. The incentives system, then, should be 
based on the attainment of longer-term financial payoffs.  
 The rules and norms associated with those diverse fields provide the context in which 
business contacts occur. The parties involved in a collaborative process, bring with them the 
logics that those contexts imply. Obviously, differences are more or less evident depending 
on the academic field of research (Brunnel et al., 2010; Rosenberg & Nelson, 1994). Many 
practical-oriented fields, such as engineering and physic, interact frequently with the 
industrial word and are often engaged in practical and applied problems. This implies that 
challenges in university-industry collaborations could vary considerably, considering 
academic research areas.  
 Despite that, their final interest and attitude remain substantially nonaligned if we 
consider that “the primary motivation of firms’ knowledge creation activities is the 
appropriation of knowledge for private gain, and openness to external actors is used as a 
strategic mechanism to gain advantage over competitors” (Brunnel et al., 2010).     
 THE BARRIERS TO UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY COLLABORATION ACCORDING TO EXTANT 
 LITERATURE       
 University-industry collaborations and their influence on innovative processes and 
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technology transfer activities, have been a longstanding object of analysis in various 
scholarly communities in management studies, such as industrial organization, the economics 
of innovation, the sociology of science, and technology policy (Perkmann & Walsh, 2007; 
Hall 2004; Mowery & Nelson 2004; Agrawal, 2001). Agrawal (2001), in doing a literature 
review on university-industry knowledge transfer, said that papers on this topic can be 
divided in four categories, depending on their focus on the firms characteristics (Choen & 
Levinthal, 1990; Zucker et al., 2000), university features (Jensen & Thursby, 1998; Feldman 
et al., 2000), geography in terms of localized spillovers (Jaffe, 1989; Zucker et al., 2000), and 
channels of knowledge transfer (Choen et al., 2000; Colyvas et al., 2000). All these issues 
highlights the problem of aligning different ways of thinking and behaving, also considering 
that technology transfer processes have a multiplex nature that must account for the bi-
directional exchange between those two institutional fields (Murray, 2002). Nevertheless, 
“collaboration between universities and companies can lead to several benefits” (Gomes et 
al., 2005). Previous works names a few, like creative breakthroughs, social change and 
outsider’s perspective (Nissani, 1997), access to knowledge networks and funding (Saez et 
al., 2002), and global improvement of both management basic research and management 
practice (Amabile et al., 2001).    
 But, while most existing research focuses on the effects of university-industry links on 
innovation-specific variables, such as patents or firm innovativeness, the organizational 
dynamics of these relationships remain under-researched (Perkmann & Walsh, 2007). Also 
the nature of the barriers to university-industry collaborations, other than conflicts over IP, 
and the factors that might mitigate them are still under-explored (Brunnel et al., 2010).   
 UNIVERSITY AND INDUSTRY: WHICH ARE THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THEIR FIELD?  
 “Knowledge resulting from basic research has characteristics of a public good and 
typically has little commercial value” (Sauermann & Stephan, 2011). ““Ideal type” industrial 
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science….focuses on generating knowledge with direct commercial potential, i.e., applied 
research and development” (Sauermann & Stephan, 2011). Following previous literature, 
what basically distinguished university from industry was the nature of their goals, the reward 
systems, and the behavioral norms regarding the disclosure of knowledge (Dasgupta & 
David, 1994). Van Dierdonck and Debackere (1988) identified three categories of barriers to 
university-industry collaboration, that are cultural, institutional and operational (Gomes et al., 
2005).      
 In particular, while academic research is driven by value of freedom, which implies a 
high degree of liberty in choosing which problems to cover and which approach to use in 
dealing with them (Sauermann & Stephan, 2011), applied research is much more devoted to 
the practical issues connected with specific firms’ core business, implying a very little 
freedom for industrial researchers. Universities deal with work that is abstract, complex and 
ambiguous, considering that much of knowledge is tacit and that time spans between project 
initiation and output may be very long (Gomes et al., 2005).  
 Moreover, academic research does not rest upon a financial incentives system. It “has 
developed a distinct incentive system that encourages the production and sharing of research 
findings based on non-financial incentives such as peer recognition from the scientific 
community” (Sauermann & Stephan, 2011; Dasgupta & David, 1994). So, priority for 
discovery and publication characterizes the traditional goals of the academy, and reputation 
and peer recognition represent the most important internal reward mechanisms (Merton, 
1973; Colyvas, 2007). And recognition by the side of peers can be obtained only by making 
research and its results publicly available. This incentives a lot the scientific community to 
rapidly disclosure the results of research via publications in top journals and presentations to 
prestigious conferences (Sauermann & Stephan, 2011; Siegel et al., 2003). The priority of 
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establishing reputation through knowledge disclosure is also critical to academic career 
(Brunnel, et al., 2010).      
 On the other hand, firms are focused on applied and practical research that promises 
financial returns. In order to obtain this goal, “firms rely on secrecy and patenting and 
discourage researchers from publishing” (Sauermann & Stephan, 2011). Moreover, the level 
of freedom inside the industrial word is completely absent, if we consider that it is organized 
in a hierarchical way. Firms desire proprietary knowledge and exclusive rights to the 
technologies that are generated, in order to exploit the competitive advantage derived from 
the development and capitalization of basic research. Business world is much more oriented 
to discourage research disclosure in order to rely upon secrecy and patenting of new 
knowledge (Sauermann & Stephan, 2011; Gans et al., 2011). The incentives system, then, 
should be based on the attainment of longer-term financial payoffs. 
 These domains posed contradictions as the features that reinforce industry also 
threaten to erode university (Colyvas, 2007). “Universities and companies have 
fundamentally different cultures, which are reflected in divergent goals, time orientations, 
basic assumptions, and languages used” (Gomes et al., 2005). University-industry 
collaboration concentrating too much on applied research and neglecting basic research may 
restrict academic openness, for example in the form of delays in publication or problems 
related to confidentiality issues, and also the quality of academic results may be affected so 
that the academic requirements cannot be met without extra work (Gomes et al., 2005). On 
the other side, one main worry related to collaboration from the point of view of firms is the 
outcome of such collaborations. The benefits and the output achieved may turn out to be 
insignificant respect to the efforts invested in joint research, and also the expected technology 
transfer process may not occur (Gomes et al., 2005).   
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 We will show below a schematic table (Table 1), with a summary of the main 
differences between academia and industry, which represent the most important causes of 
barriers to university-industry collaborations.  
   -------------------------------------------------------- 
    Insert Table 1 about here 
   -------------------------------------------------------- 
  
 THE SUPPORT TO UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY COLLABORATION 
 Within the large body of literature on university-industry relationships few attention 
has been paid to the role that external supporting mechanisms might play both in establishing 
university-industry links and coordinating them. Improving our understanding of diversities 
between academia and industry, could be crucial for identifying a set of organizational and 
managerial practices that might be significant to overcoming barriers to university-business 
relationships (Siegel et al., 2004).  
 The enhanced importance of technology transfer activities for global and local 
competitiveness asked the creation of dedicated offices and organizations (Piccaluga et al., 
2010) for getting over the problem of aligning different ways of thinking and behaving.    
In 1980, the United States legislation, known as the Bayh-Dole Act, represented an attempt, 
made by the Congress, to remove the obstacles to university to industry technology transfer 
(Siegel et al., 2003). In particular, immediately after this legislation, many universities 
established TTOs, to manage and protect the results of academic research. In fact, “the role of 
the TTO is to facilitate commercial knowledge transfer and technological diffusion through 
the licensing to industry of inventions or other forms of intellectual property resulting from 
university research” (Siegel et al., 2003).  
 A similar process, but a few years late, occurred in Italy at the beginning of this 
century with the law “Tremonti-bis”, which had set new rules about intellectual property 
rights and had deeply sped up the process of TTOs creation. Thus, in contrast to most of the 
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rest of the world, the Italian legislator has introduced a rule similar to that in law is known as 
the “professor's privilege”, whereby the results of research conducted inside the University 
belong to the researchers rather than the institution (Bianchi & Piccaluga, 2012). This 
regulation change has obviously opened the problem of managing research results from 
academic scientists, in particular considering the trade-off they face in deciding how to use 
the findings of their pieces of research. Universities’ reaction has been to gear up for 
providing researchers with the necessary services to facilitate the industrial exploitation of 
inventions, avoiding the fact that they could independently pursue technology transfer 
activities.  
 In this way, on the one hand, TTOs bring academic research closer to practitioners 
and entrepreneurs in performing the commercialization of internal technologies, on the other 
hand, they allow firms to approach academic researchers using the support of an intermediary 
unit. 
 The 2010 research conducted by Netval, showed that the first TTOs mission was the 
promotion and exploitation, in an economic way, of the research results and skills. Moreover, 
the main objective was to improve technology transfer processes and sustain regional and 
local economic development. TTOs have been the subject of many studies, whereof the 
majority have scrutinized their effectiveness in enhancing university-industry technology 
transfer (Siegel et al., 2003), and the institutional, environmental and organizational factors 
which determine TTOs effectiveness (Siegel et al., 2003; Tahvanainen & Hermans, 2011).  
 So, our aim in this work is to better explore in which way the support to university-
industry collaborations, in the form of TTOs, occurs and which are the features, both of 
TTOs, and of academic and business contexts, that contribute to mitigate the barriers to these 
relationships. In fact, as Siegel et al. (2003) said, the TTOs key stakeholders are: “(1) 
university scientists, who discover new technologies, (2) boundary organizations technology 
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managers and administrators, who serve as liaisons between academic scientists and industry 
and manage the university’s intellectual property and knowledge, and (3) firms/entrepreneurs, 
who commercialize university-based technologies”. A recent work by Brunnel and colleagues 
(2010) has already tried to analyze the barriers to collaborations and the factors which could 
mitigate such barriers, but there is still room to enhance our knowledge about this issue.  
 As such, our study is motivated by the following research questions: what are the real 
barriers to university-industry collaboration? May the external support mitigate these 
obstacles? Which kind of characteristics are required to do this? 
 
3. CASE STUDIES SELECTION 
 The data presented in this paper have been collected as part of a larger study aimed at 
understanding how university-business collaborations take shape, what difficulties and 
incentives they meet, and which kind of support they receive by external organizations.      
 We will use an inductive approach for exploring the research questions we have 
posed. Taking into account that our aim is to bring new theoretical insights to the literature 
presented above and that the issues pertaining to university-business collaboration and, in 
particular, to the support they receive from outside, is still confusing, we retain appropriate, at 
this stage, to proceed with an exploratory case study method. It is important to clarify that, 
whether the purpose of the research is to develop theory at first, not to test it, theoretical (not 
random or stratified) sampling is appropriate. “Theoretical sampling simply means that cases 
are selected because they are particularly suitable for illuminating and extending relationships 
and logic among constructs” (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Using a theoretical sampling 
methodology, we will show below the cases we will select depending on the importance they 
would have for our analysis and subsequent development. In this sense, the selection of cases 
was very careful in choosing the ones that fit more our need to understand in depth some 
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aspects of university-industry collaboration.  
 So, in this paper, we conducted case analyses of two universities, and in particular of 
their TTOs, which have the goal to promote knowledge diffusion, from inside to outside, and 
technology transfer between university and enterprises. The two cases are the TTOs of 
Politecnico di Torino and University of Bologna. We considered several factors in selecting 
these two units as our cases.  
 First of all, University of Bologna and Politecnico di Torino represent two of the most 
active and oldest universities involved in technology transfer activities, within the Italian 
context, both in patenting/licensing and in spin-off creation. A second reason is that they are 
very different in terms of internal and external characteristics. Politecnico di Torino and 
University of Bologna include very different fields of research, which deeply affect the 
effectiveness and the success of their technology transfer work. While Politecnico di Torino 
is a technical University, composed only by Engineering and Architecture schools, University 
of Bologna has to deal with an heterogeneous university, which comprehends also humanities 
(besides scientific disciplines). In this sense, they allow to enhance variation between cases, 
which is a way for strengthening the findings from the entire study (Yin, 2004), increasing 
the robustness of final results. Moreover, these two TTOs had been chosen also for the 
importance of academic science and scientific results of the Universities they belong to. In 
fact, University of Bologna and Politecnico di Torino represent two outstanding examples 
both in terms of quality of research produced and of success in technology transfer and 
licensing operation (Bianchi & Piccaluga, 2012).  
 In Table 2 we summarize the main features of the two, that are institutional 
characteristics, and technology transfer and R&D involvement.  
We introduce, then, the two cases, briefly explaining data gathering methods. 
   -------------------------------------------------------- 
    Insert Table 2 about here 
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 TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AT POLITECNICO DI TORINO 
 Despite Politecnico di Torino has all along developed a technology transfer culture as 
“institutional” mission, from a formal point of view it does not have an out-and-out 
Technology Transfer Office (TTO). The lack of an office so named and univocally 
recognized in its functions, may seem a paradox, especially for an university such as 
Politecnico di Torino, which has a strong technical and technological inclination and a strong 
technology transfer vocation (Bianchi & Piccaluga, 2012).  
 If we want to identify a specific period as “starting point” for a more informed 
discussion on technology transfer issues, we have to go back to the late ‘90s, when, under the 
rectorship of Prof. Zich, specific regulations for intellectual and industrial property and for 
spin-offs creation were established. The ad hoc regulations have helped to systematize 
procedures and processes related to patenting activities and firms creation, setting up specific 
principles and managerial aspects. Technology transfer activities and the relationship with the 
industrial world, which are usually peculiar to TTO, are managed by Ufficio Contratti, which 
is part of the wider Area dedicated to research support and technology transfer (SARTT). 
Ufficio Contratti has grown and strengthened its competencies during these 20 years: from 
the initial bargaining for third parties in the ‘80s, to the more active bargaining in the ‘90s, it 
has arrived to patent and licensing activities management and to the support to companies 
with high innovative value creation. So, Ufficio Contratti is not exclusively focalized on 
patenting, as a tool for research exploitation, but also on interconnected activities, such as the 
improvement of collaboration with industrial word and research centers, and the 
strengthening of the relations with the market for research results diffusion (Bianchi et al., 
2012). As the responsible of the Office said, “the reference model for technology transfer 
activities is that of “Cittadella Politecnica”, a label coined by rector Profumo, which 
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identifies a shared area, where the knowledge developed within the academia joints with 
practical application”.   
 The Office dedicated to technology transfer activities is composed by 9 people, but 
only 7 have customary contacts with academics and firms. The Office is divided in three 
main domains, which are the support to national, regional and local projects, the support to 
European projects and the backup to negotiation with industry. The Office carries on a very 
productive activity in technology transfer, insomuch as the amount of funding received for 
national and international projects, conventions and contracts on behalf of a third party, 
amount to over 41 mln of euros in 2011 (Bianchi & Piccaluga, 2012). This Office is now 
recognized as the official interface between academic and industrial worlds.    
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AT UNIVERSITY OF BOLOGNA 
 We find a formal Knowledge Transfer Office (KTO) at the University of Bologna 
since 2004, when a global Plan of revision and reorganization of the research area was 
improved. In particular, under the boosts of some academic researchers, who took as example 
some US universities, where they went to understand what was going on about technology 
transfer, an immediate awareness of the importance of such activities began to originate. 
Moreover, following the main idea of the Revision Plan, the fact that research had to be the 
central aspect of the University of Bologna and that research exploitation had also to be 
stimulated from on high, begun to spread over the university management level.  
 However, not all the rectorship have strongly worked on these issues, so that 
technology transfer activities related to patenting and spin-offs creation has not always been 
particularly stimulated. Sometimes, priority has been given to project design for European 
funding, while this part has been less pushed and incentivized, both from the point of view of 
the management of intellectual property coming from independent research, and intellectual 
property arising from commissioned or cooperative research. This is confirmed by the results 
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of the last years, which say that the quali-quantitative potential of Bologna University is at 
least 2/3 times what we see today. 
 Anyway, a continuous teamwork has led to KTO establishment, functioning, and 
improvement, and to the formation of two separate, but strongly interconnected, souls, that 
are intellectual property protection and intellectual property exploitation. While the first is 
much more focused on inventions protection through patents, the latter is more oriented on 
research valorization, both through the widening of contacts with business world, and through 
the establishment of spin-off coming from innovative ideas within University. As a whole 
KTO is now established within the bigger research area, denominated ARIC (Area Ricerca e 
Trasferimento Tecnologico). Nowadays, a team of 5-6 persons work full-time on these issues, 
trying to act as a bridge between academic researchers’ inventions and industrial world needs.        
As a member of the management level says: “unfortunately the last and this years are unique 
years for the university system as a whole, with clear priorities, such as the enforcement of 
the university system reform – statute, governance, etc… - but, despite the situation of strong 
transition, with my drive and the political support of the Pro-rector for research, who has set 
up with the new Rectorate (this figure did not exist before), attention to the issue of 
intellectual property management and spin-offs creation are definitely coming back in vogue. 
We will see the results in a few years”.      
   -------------------------------------------------------- 
    Insert Table 3 about here 
   -------------------------------------------------------- 
 
4. FINDINGS  
THE OBSTACLES ACCORDING TO ACADEMICS AND CEOS  
 Table 4 shows the main barriers to collaboration perceived and pointed out by 
respondents. In particular, we hold to the three categories of barriers identified by Van 
Dierdonck and Debackere (1988) and we divide our results according to this criterion. We 
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also report in brackets the number of time that a particular obstacle was mentioned, in order 
to communicate the perception that respondents have about the inhibitory role of the barriers 
to collaboration they stressed.  
 The most important obstacles highlighted by academics and CEOs are in line with 
previous literature, even if some additional, interesting details came out. In particular, in the 
table below, we see that the problem of different time perception and language used is highly 
recognized both by academics and CEOs. Specifically, CEOs consider time a fundamental 
factor and a valuable resource, which has a high economic worth. Within the industrial world 
all is measured taking into account the final payoff and the time required to obtain it; if the 
latter cannot be quantified, the whole project is not worth to be undertaken. “Time is money” 
is the well known saying that in a well-suited manner characterizes the industrial world as a 
whole. On the other hand, academics consider time more as an opportunity for obtaining their 
results, rather than a fundamental resource which has to be controlled exactly. Whereas CEOs 
give a strategic meaning to it, academics are more flexible and deem more important to 
obtain better results in longer time rather than passable ones in a shorter one. Whereas CEOs 
prefer to work on time with uncertain and perfectible data, academic researchers tend to reach 
the best, even if it takes more time. This is not only an operational issue, but it also a matter 
of different incentives systems. In particular, where academics are incentivized to produce 
high quality research in order to obtain recognition from their peers, business world is 
completely market oriented, in the sense that it tries to use and exploit each result to satisfy 
customers’ needs. Within the industrial sector each process undertaken is much more 
considered in terms of costs rather than of possible benefits achievable with future 
investments. According to business, all the results obtained by research must respond to 
practical demands and be usable shortly; according to academia, the more a result coming 
from research is promising for future important, innovative discoveries, the more academic 
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researchers are prompted to go on, to try to find something really striking, without 
considering how long it takes. 
 As far as the cultural barriers concern, different mindset and motivations are the most 
common sources of conflicts perceived by academic researchers and CEOs in university-
industry relationship. In particular, university and business world are often at variance with 
what they want and need. Their theoretical view, on one side, and practical, on the other side, 
bring too often to misunderstanding and to different approaches, which are hardly compatible 
without a deep mediation. Many collaborations do not come to end just due to these initial 
difficulties. The closeness of objectives and motivations is perceived by respondents to be 
highly important for undertaking a working relationship. What CEOs highlight is the fact that 
academic researchers often think to be in a position of superiority respect to knowledge 
transfer. What we, instead, believe is that both the sides have to learn from the other, and, if 
academia has a stronger position as knowledge holder in general terms, the industry could be 
more accustomed to work with practical problems. In this sense, if a collaboration aspires to 
become successful, the flow of knowledge, experiences and expertise should be bi-
directional, instead of unidirectional from university to business world.  
 Subdividing barriers in cultural, institutional and operational, we found two main 
characteristics for each category. While the most relevant cultural barriers are mindset and 
motivation, the most important institutional ones are bureaucracy and incentives system, and 
the main operational barriers are the perception of time and the language used.  In table 4 we 
quote pieces of answers given by academics and CEOs to our interview. We think that they 
are particularly suitable to clear our awareness about the specific barriers to university-
industry collaborations, pointed out by respondents.  
   -------------------------------------------------------- 
    Insert Table 4 about here 
   -------------------------------------------------------- 
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WHICH ASPECTS CAN MITIGATE THE OBSTACLES TO UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY 
COLLABORATION?   
 The most interesting issues come out from interviews are those related to support to 
the interaction between public research and industry. In particular, it is worth highlighting 
that both academics and CEOs put the attention on TTOs, as structures that could facilitate 
the relationships between these different parties.      
 Three major themes emerged in our analysis: the importance of TTO characteristics, 
the dimension and strategies of industrial part and the previous experiences of parties. Our 
results underline that the perception of respondents about the possible success or failure of 
TTOs, as mediators in university-industry collaboration, is highly linked to some TTOs 
internal characteristics and particular parties’ features.  
 TTOs aspects can be summarized in two main categories: 
- the characteristics of TTOs human resources involved in technology transfer 
activities; 
- trust in complex and inter-fields relationship managed by TTOs.   
As far as the external characteristics concern, respondents ascribe the success of those 
collaborations, for the most part, to two main aspects: 
- the previous experiences of academics and CEOs in collaborative projects; 
- the industrial part dimension and strategies. 
 We would like to linger over the TTOs features, that both academic researchers and 
CEOs stressed as those aspects that might contribute to make public-private relationships 
easier, especially during the negotiation phase. Specific characteristics of TTOs people and 
trust in collaborations managed by TTOs employees, are those aspects that both academics 
and CEOs have appreciated most in their past experiences.  
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 In particular, as far as the former concerns, we found that respondents distinguish 
between two main typologies of characteristics: those related to competences and 
background; and those associated to personal attitudes. A CEO told us that “not all the people 
can function as TTO employees and, in particular, as TTO manager. They should have 
particular characteristics both in terms of acquired competences and innate features. They 
have to manage complex situations in which each part tends to do its interests and reach its 
goals. Surely, they must look out for different needs and try to combine them”   
 In table 5 we show in a schematic way what personal features of TTOs human 
resources are considered important by respondents for managing university-industry 
relationships.  
   -------------------------------------------------------- 
    Insert Table 5 about here 
   -------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 As we see in the previous table, both academics and CEOs think that specific 
expertise and attitudes of  TTOs people are fundamental to hope that technology transfer 
takes place successfully. They stressed that TT is by itself a very difficult process, which 
highly depends on a large number of factors, not easily verifiable. In this sense, they believe 
that reducing the risk of failure with mediators having specific features and attitudes, might 
be a good solution for enhancing the effectiveness of TT process.  
 Besides the particular aspects highlighted above, another important issue, came out 
from interviews, in managing university-industry collaboration, is trust between parties and 
in particular trust in how TTOs manage those relationships. The importance of trust has been 
particularly highlighted both by academics and CEOs. According to academics, the quality of 
relationship with TTO is necessary but not sufficient to have a successful TT process. This 
has been even confirmed by people employed in TTOs, who firmly believe that without a 
relationship of trust with other parties, even the best technology would have problems to be 
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transferred on the market. So, the importance to play the right roles in the different phases 
and to align goals, methodologies and approaches, is fundamental to let researchers and 
CEOs think that TTO is acting in a clear way. A TTO manager said that “trust in relationship 
is even more important, as we move outside the university, in the industrial world, where 
relations are a bit more complicated. In the business sector, there is a big mismatch between 
expectations and the actual TTOs ability to foster TT. Companies have strong expectations of 
university system, sometimes too high, sometimes too arrogant. This requires a very high 
feeling of confidence in TTOs employees, in order to expect a successful technology transfer 
process”. This is to say that, not only the feeling of confidence is fundamental per se, but it is 
even more significant as we go from academic researchers to business CEOs opinion; and 
this is due to the fact that the distrust of university offices from enterprises is higher than 
from inside. A CEO told that “confidence in TTO people is a really important aspect 
considering that it affects the way we approach the relationships. If we trust them, we 
undertake the relationship more lightly and the likelihood to obtain a useful and innovative 
output is higher. I’m not actually able to tell which are the elements that increase trust, but 
surely the way TTO employees work and behave is fundamental for building a good 
relationship through their mediation”.  
 Considering the other aspects that have been mentioned by respondents, they are 
incident to firms characteristics, and academic and CEOs previous experiences in 
collaborative research. What is worth highlighting is that firm dimension often bear on the 
success or failure of TT processes. In particular, the most part of academic researchers and 
TTOs employees said that a collaboration with a big enterprise is, in a sense, easier to 
manage. A TTO manager told that “big businesses already have a clear idea of what is 
research and what is needed to do it. Often, they have inner research units, but they lack in 
competences. Anyway, when you chat with this kind of persons, you can talk as equals 
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because the objectives are many times convergent”. So, firm size could make a huge different 
when TTOs try to manage university-industry collaboration. To reiterate the concept, big 
enterprises are often interested in frontier research, as well as in research that generates 
output immediately marketable. They have a more open mind and they are ready to spend 
more money for research usable and exploitable in the long term. This is a characteristics that 
academic researchers appreciate a lot, because academic research is not extremely market-
oriented per se, and often springs out results that are unlikely to be used in the short period. 
For all these reasons, a collaboration with a big firm is more likely to succeed, also because 
the effort required of TTO for managing divergent goals, interests, etc. ... is lower. 
 As far as the last aspect concerns, all the respondents said that previous experience in 
similar collaborations plays a fundamental role in TT activities. In particular, if one side has 
already experimented a relation with a subject external to its field, when it decides to 
undertake a collaboration, it already knows the way of approaching, of acting and the 
requirements and requests of the counter-party. This allows to save time and to coordinate 
relationship in a more efficient way. Often, when parties decide to begin another 
collaboration after other experiences, it might mean that they had positive results and that the 
relationships with the other side was constructive. In this case, the effort to understand what 
the other part want and request is less burdensome. “When I decide to embark on a 
relationship with a firm is always as if for the first time, even though I already had other 
experiences. But, when I find a company that has already experienced a collaboration with 
university, this is surely easier. It seems to speak with someone that already know my/our 
way of thinking”, said an academic researcher. A CEO of a small and medium enterprise told 
that “the decision of beginning a collaboration with university is always a lottery. We know 
for sure when we start a project, but never when we will end. Things are different when the 
academic side already had an experience with our filed, because they are able to better 
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understand our needs and our demands in terms of time and objectives. However, at the end, 
if we arrive, we are always late”.  
 We report in Figure 1 the summarizing model, showing the main issues that have been 
highlighted by respondents, as those aspects that might facilitate a successfull university-
industry relation.  
   -------------------------------------------------------- 
    Insert Figure 1 about here 
   -------------------------------------------------------- 
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 The cases highlight that the absence of a unified culture and mission between 
university and industry lies at the bottom of incomprehension and different approaches for 
their collaboration. The model proposed in this work is that the presence of a third party, as 
mediator between university and industry, might enhance the likelihood of collaboration 
success a lot, if some specific characteristics are at play. What we want to stress is that the 
presence of a moderator is not, by itself, sufficient. Particular aspects have been identified in 
our work and they may be of interest both to academics and CEOs, which want to undertake a 
collaborative relation with the other party, but also to TTOs, that should interact with parties 
having different mindset and objectives. The model clearly states which are the main 
characteristics, identified by respondents, that might make the difference in collaboration 
outcome, and this could help each party to know in advance what difficulties it should meet, 
but also guidelines for how to let them converging.            
 We think that our study has both theoretical and policy implications. We contribute to 
the discussion on technology transfer and innovation (Bruneel et al., 2010; Abramo et al., 
2009; Perkmann & Walsh, 2007; Agrawal, 2001). Although different approaches and lines of 
research have been followed in studying university-industry collaboration, extant works have 
mainly focused on the drivers of academia and industry interaction (D’Este & Patel, 2007), 
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on the barriers between them (Gomes et al., 2005; Bruneel et al., 2010), and on collaborations 
as a whole (Philbin, 2008; Perkmann & Walsh, 2007). Little is known about the aspects that 
might influence the performance and effectiveness of those relationships. In this sense, 
shedding light on the support that university-industry collaboration may receive by external 
unites, such as TTOs, we contribute to enhance our understanding on how the barriers 
between academia and industry might be mitigated. We also make a differentiation on the 
nature that such obstacles can have.  
 However, we think that the most interesting and innovative issue we report is the one 
related to the external support that university and industry might receive from TTOs, as outer 
units respect to collaboration. Surprisingly, even though some recent works appeared on the 
issue, such a topic is still messy and confusing on management studies. By showing some 
characteristics which have an impact on the collaboration outcome, we enhance our 
knowledge on this theme from a theoretical point of view. This has been possible thanks to 
the use of an inductive methodology, that try to generate theory from observation.   
 As far as management implications concern, dealing with TTOs, and relationships that 
occur among them and academics and CEOs, this work might be of use for firms managers, 
who are trying to establish contacts with academic researchers, but also for universities and 
scientists. Findings could be useful to managers for better understanding barriers and 
opportunities in technology transfer relationships where multiple interests are present. This is 
especially true in the Italian context, where no scientific researches deal with these problems. 
 Moreover, focusing on organizations which mediate these collaborations, will shed 
more light on their effectiveness in combining different interests and objectives.  
We could try to test out our results in European countries that have characteristics similar to 
Italy, both in terms of university and industrial system. On the other hand, it might be also 
interesting to understand whether relevant differences exist among Italy and countries more 
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advanced respect to it in the market economy.   
 A future extension aimed at comparing Italy with another country is not excluded. In 
particular, it would be interesting to rest upon the variables reported in this work, and 
compare the results obtained in this study with the ones from another country comparable 
with Italy, to see if substantial differences spring up. This might be done using a quantitative 
approach, with hypothesis testing.  
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Table 1. Main differences between university and industry 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Cultural differences University Industry 
Objectives  
Basic research for publications Applied research for economic results 
Motivation  Disclosure of research results for 
academic career and recognition  
Protect research results for competitive 
advantage and financial returns 
Institutional differences University Industry 
Reward system  Based on peer recognition and 
reputation 
Based on financial returns 
Organization of work  
Academic scientists enjoy high level of 
freedom vs. lower wages  
Industrial researchers enjoy low level of 
freedom vs. higher wages 
Operational differences University Industry 
Language used 
Abstract, ambiguous and complex 
Goal-oriented and concise 
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Table 2. The main characteristics of Politecnico di Torino and University of Bologna (2011)  
 
Institutional characteristics Politecnico di Torino University of Bologna 
Institutional Control Public Public 
# of students 30,000 87,000 
# of academics (full, associate 
and assistant professors) 839  3,900 
# of academics in Engineering 
and Architecture 900 (2011) 435 (2009) 
Foreign students on the total 15% 6% 
# of fileds of study 2 19 
Typology of Schools Engineering and Architecture 
Arts and Humanities, 
Engineering and Technology, 
Social Science, Life Science, 
Physical Science, Health 
# Research Doctorate 
Programs < 30 > 50 
Technology transfer 
characteristics 
  
Existence of formal TTO No Yes 
Office/Area Name SARTT Area Knowledge Transfer Office 
Establishment of TT activities late '90 2002-2003 
# of employees dealing with 
TT activities 7 5 
# of patents 29 (approved in 2011) 177 (existing at 2011) 
 
 
 
154 
 
Table 3. Data sources 
 
Semi-structured interviews Politecnico di Torino University of Bologna 
Academic researchers 5 3 
Academic management level 2 2 
CEOs 3 3 
TTOs employees 3 4 
Other sources (website, formal and 
informal documents, report, etc…) 
30 pages 20 pages 
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Table 4. Barriers to collaboration pointed out by respondents 
 
Cultural barriers University Industry 
Mindset (24) “Business world is strongly 
convinced that we have solutions 
ready for use. They don’t understand 
that solutions for specific problems 
could take even months or years to be 
found. We are not a shop where they 
can find solutions at a low price” 
(resp. 11)  
“Academic researchers too often 
believe that their inventions are useful 
and marketable a priori. This is 
absolute wrong! Cooperation and 
coordination is for that reason 
fundamental; but, academia rarely 
accepts instructions and suggestions” 
(resp. 2) 
 
“We are absolutely aware that 
academia is the most reliable 
knowledge holder. But, while we 
recognize its superiority on “the 
what”, on the other hand we believe 
that “the how” should be agreed with 
us from the beginning” (resp. 3)      
Motivation (24) “We have always to consider that our 
first objective is to advance the 
frontier knowledge. So, knowledge 
diffusion is extremely important to let 
other researchers learn what we 
already know and what is missing” 
(resp. 6)    
“What is sometimes hard to impose 
on academic researchers is the fact 
that results protection lies at the 
bottom of our competitive advantage. 
We are highly motivated to keep 
knowledge and innovative results 
secret, because our life is the death of 
our competitors” (resp. 14)      
Institutional barriers   
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Bureaucracy (24) “The problem of bureaucracy within 
university is something that actually 
exists. In this case I agree with CEOs 
and I completely understand their 
point of view” (resp. 7) 
 
“CEOs always notice that our 
bureaucratic system is too hard-shell. 
It is difficult to answer back to this 
remark, but it is something that we 
cannot control at all” (resp. 1)   
“Bureaucracy within university is 
something indescribable!! If you are 
in a hurry and want a contract within 
a week, be sure that you have to wait 
at least 1 or 2 months” (resp. 18) 
Incentives system (17) “Our major incentive is to produce 
scientific output and to publish them 
in top journals, in order to facilitate 
career and to obtain credibility and 
high recognition within academia” 
(resp. 8) 
“We are incentivized to obtain 
economic results as soon as possible. 
Only in that way we can hope for pay 
increase and fast career” (resp. 20) 
Operational barriers   
The perception of time (24) “Our way of working is not based on 
the haste to arrive to a final and 
concrete result. This is not our 
priority” (resp. 16)   
 
“Our way of working is based on 
short-term plans and specific goals. 
Time is money!” (resp. 19) 
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Table 5. What kind of characteristics TTOs human resources should have, in terms of both acquired and innate characteristics, 
and what they should do, according to academics and CEOs 
 
Acquired expertise Innate characteristics 
Competences Background Attitudes 
They vary depending on technology 
transfer (hereinafter TT) activity. In 
particular, different phases of  TT 
require different competences in 
terms of legal, marketing, technical-
scientific, etc… knowledge   
Preferably specific kind of education: 
economics, law or engineering 
 
The importance of communication and 
public relations in TT activities, both 
with academics and CEOs   
Importance to do refresher courses on 
specific TT issues 
Preferably with postgraduate education  
(this requirement has been much more 
stressed by academic researchers) 
Ability to work in team  
Ability to understand more or less 
what a technology is about and 
knowing the process of patenting 
With previous work experience.  
The best would be to have work 
experience both in the public sector (to 
know its bureaucracy and rules) and in 
the private one (to know its needs and 
demands)  
Ability to understand different needs 
and requirements and to manage and 
mediate among them 
Preferably with previous experience in 
TT activities: learning by doing 
Ability to build and maintain social 
relations: to do network 
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Figure 1.  The model  
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APPENDIX A 
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL FOR ORGANIZATIONS6 
 
 
PROFILO INTERVISTATO 
- Quando ha iniziato a lavorare in quest’organizzazione e che ruoli ha ricoperto 
finora?  
- Cosa l’ha spinta a lavorare per quest’organizzazione? 
PROFILO ORGANIZZAZIONE 
- Saprebbe dirmi quando e come quest’organizzazione è stata fondata (chi ne ha 
preso parte e chi l’ha veramente voluta)? 
• Caratteristiche organizzative 
- Quante persone impiega attualmente? 
- Qual è il tasso di crescita? Il turnover è alto o basso? 
• Obiettivi e Valori 
- Qual è il principale obiettivo (terminal value) di questa organizzazione? Ce ne 
sono di secondari? Sono collegati fra loro? 
- Quali sono i valori fondamentali (instrumental values) di questa organizzazione? 
 (ES. efficienza operativa, soddisfazione stakeholders, soddisfazione dei 
dipendenti, spirito di  appartenenza, massimizzazione profitto, crescita, sopravvivenza, 
apertura verso l’esterno,  alta produttività, riduzione dei costi, ecc...)  
- Nella sua percezione, gli obiettivi differiscono fra le persone che lavorano 
all’interno di questa organizzazione? 
                                                             
6
 This protocol has been drawn up following some examples present in neo-institutional literature and the 
valuable suggestions given by some neo-institutional scholars, such as Anne-Claire Pache and Royston 
Greenwood.  
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- Ed i valori? In che senso? 
 
• Struttura organizzativa 
- Qual è la struttura di governance di questa organizzazione? 
- Qual è la composizione del Consiglio di Amministrazione/Organo decisionale? 
Come è stata scelta questa composizione? È cambiata nel tempo? 
- Che tipo di decisioni prende? 
- Ritiene che la composizione del CdA/Organo decisionale, così come lei me l’ha 
detta, incorpori interessi provenienti da diversi contesti istituzionali?   
- Pensi alla sua organizzazione; fino a che punto può essere considerata complessa 
in termini di:  
 relazioni interne (1 = non complessa (linearità delle relazioni), 7 = molto 
complessa (relazioni difficili e poco chiare));  
 relazioni con altre istituzioni/organizzazioni (1 = non complessa (poche 
relazioni con altre istituzioni), 7 = molto complessa (relazioni con molte 
istituzioni diverse)); 
 processi decisionali (1 = non complessa (processo lineare e chiaro), 7 = 
molto complessa (molti punti di vista da prendere in considerazione per prendere 
decisioni))? 
 
• Caratteristiche di contesto 
- Chi sono i principali portatori d’interesse di questa organizzazione? 
- Quali sono gli interessi di ognuno di essi? 
- Secondo lei, ci sono dei portatori d’interesse che godono di una posizione 
privilegiata (ES. maggiore peso sui processi decisi
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- Se lei dovesse valutare la loro importanza per questa organizzazione, come 
valuterebbe ognuno di loro (1 = non importante, 7 = molto importante)? 
 
• Strategia organizzativa 
- In che modo questa organizzazione salvaguarda gli interessi degli stakeholders 
provenienti da diversi contesti (es. Accademia vs. Mercato)?  
- In che modo vengono gestiti i rapporti con loro? Tutti gli stakeholders vengono 
considerati sullo stesso piano, o qualcuno ha dei canali preferenziali e più 
veloci? 
- Quale serie di incentivi questa organizzazione mette in gioco al fine di 
salvaguardare gli interessi dei suoi diversi stakeholders? 
- Quale tipo di incentivi, secondo lei, potrebbero contribuire a stimolare la 
collaborazione fra diverse parti?  
- Ritiene che questa organizzazione abbia sempre facilitato la collaborazione fra 
parti portatrici di diversi interessi, portandole ad un accordo/allineamento; o, 
piuttosto, ritiene che in alcuni casi il coordinamento di esse verso un accordo 
non sia stato raggiunto? Potrebbe fornirmi qualche esempio di entrambi i casi (se 
ce ne sono)? 
- Come vengono prese le decisioni in questa organizzazione? Da chi e seguendo 
quali criteri? (rifletta su un caso recente in cui è stata presa una decisione e 
quindi sulle persone che sono state coinvolte) 
- Se pensa ai processi decisionali di questa organizzazione, fino a che punto 
possono essere considerati ambigui e caratterizzati da conflitto fra le persone? 
Fino a che punto la decisione finale può essere attribuita a scelte interne e/o a 
politiche/attori esterni? 
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- Che tipo di indicatori usate per valutare la performance di questa 
organizzazione? 
- Avete un indicatore sintetico? 
• Strategia commerciale e finanziaria 
- Qual è la principale strategia commerciale di questa organizzazione?  
- In che modo la “scienza accademica” e la “logica di mercato” vengono usate in 
essa? 
- Ritiene che questa organizzazione abbia dei concorrenti? Se sì, chi sono? 
 
- In generale, come viene finanziata questa organizzazione?  
- Che tipo di sussidi/finanziamenti – sia pubblici che privati – riceve (se ce ne 
sono)?  
- Come viene allocato l’utile? 
• Tensione fra logiche istituzionali 
- Percepisce all’interno di questa organizzazione una tensione fra la dimensione 
“accademica” e quella di “mercato” (tensione intesa anche semplicemente come 
divergenza di vedute)? 
- Se sì, in che senso (fornire degli esempi se ci sono)? 
- Queste tensioni sono problematiche da gestire? 
- Secondo lei, quali sono le principali cause di queste tensioni? 
- Come pensa che potrebbero essere risolte? Come vengono realmente risolte?  
- Pensi che la tua organizzazione sia un punto di riferimento, in termini di 
trasferimento tecnologico, per accademici e managers d’impresa? 
- Pensi che loro siano soddisfatti del lavoro che voi svolgete? 
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- Oltre al mondo accademico e a quello del business, quali altri contesti 
istituzionali sono presenti in questa organizzazione? Cioè, quali altri interessi, 
impersonati da altre parti, vivono qui dentro? 
- Secondo lei, in questa organizzazione è considerata più importante la 
performance economica o l’efficacia delle attività di trasferimento tecnologico?  
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APPENDIX B 
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL FOR ACADEMICS, EXECUTIVES AND INDUSTRIAL MANAGERS7 
 
PROFILO ACCADEMICI E MANAGERS D’IMPRESA 
• Caratteristiche del lavoro svolto 
- A quale istituzione sente di appartenere?  
- Se dovesse descrivere il suo lavoro (come scienziato o uomo d’affari) in 3 
parole, cosa direbbe?  
- Come descriverebbe, brevemente, il principale obiettivo del suo lavoro (come 
scienziato o uomo d’affari)? E quali sono, secondo lei, i valori fondamentali 
connessi ad esso?  
- Se dovesse classificare la loro importanza, come li classificherebbe (1 = non 
importante, 7 = molto importante)? 
- Quanto considera importante il loro rispetto/osservanza? Perché? 
- Cosa fa/come si comporta, in termini pratici, per rispettarli? 
- Se dovesse infrangere questi valori, cosa pensa che potrebbe accadere? Questo 
comportamento come verrebbe considerato dai suoi colleghi? 
- Fino a che punto considera importante l’opinione dei suoi colleghi circa il 
rispetto di regole e norme relative al suo lavoro? 
• Incentivi a collaborare 
- Quali sono, secondo lei, le differenze più rilevanti fra il mondo dell’accademica 
e quello del business? 
                                                             
7
 This protocol has been drawn up following some examples present in neo-institutional literature and the 
valuable suggestions given by some neo-institutional scholars, such as Anne-Claire Pache and Royston 
Greenwood.  
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- Se dovesse pensare a 5 “cose” che potrebbero incentivarla ad intraprendere una 
collaborazione lavorativa con persone che appartengono ad un contesto diverso 
(ambito professionale), quindi con diversi interessi rispetto ai suoi, cosa direbbe? 
- Ritiene che collaborare con persone appartenenti a diversi contesti istituzionali, 
quindi con diversi obiettivi ed interessi, sia utile o no? Perché? 
 
- Le organizzazioni di “confine” come i TTOs e gli Incubatori Univ. cosa le 
permettono di raggiungere in più, in termini di rapporti di collaborazione, che 
prima non era possibile? 
- In che modo e fino a che punto esse permettono l’allineamento dei suoi interessi 
con quelli di parti diverse (con diversi interessi)?  
- Ritiene che il compito che esse svolgono sia importante per il raggiungimento di 
questi accordi fra le parti; oppure, ritiene che lo stesso risultato potrebbe essere 
raggiunto anche senza la loro presenza?  
- Qual è il tuo grado di soddisfazione riguardo alle esperienze avute con questo 
tipo di organizzazioni? 
- Pensi che ti rivolgerai ad essere per progetti future? 
- Sei in buoni rapporti con loro e con la parte industriale a cui loro, in qualche 
modo, ti hanno fatto avvicinare? 
 
 
DOMANDE A RAPPRESENTANTI ISTITUZIONALI (ES. RETTORE, VICE RETTORE, ECC…) 
- Potrebbe ricostruire il quadro organizzativo che c’è a monte della scelta delle 
Università, ed in particolare per questa Università, di differenziare i modi con 
cui interagire con le aziende private? Nello specifico, pensando ai TTO, 
Incubatori, Laboratori congiunti di ricerca e Consorzi/Fondazioni, cosa aveva in 
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mente questa Università e quali obiettivi si prefiggeva di raggiungere, nella 
collaborazione con il privato, con ciascuna di queste forme organizzative? 
- Quando questa Università ha deciso di aprirsi ai privati? Cosa significa per 
questa Università collaborare con aziende private? 
- A livello di processi decisionali, chi ha deciso ed in che modo è stato deciso di 
aprirsi verso l’esterno? 
- Ci sono state delle Università che hanno fatto da capofila nella creazione di 
queste organizzazioni? Cioè, c’è qualcuno che ha dato l’avvio a questo tipo di 
strategia, a cui poi gli altri si sono allineati? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
